Western Sahara Endgame: A Tale of Deception and Dishonesty about Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara

Likewise even the touchy issue of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara has seen forward movement. In 2007, the government advanced a proposal to break the long-standing impasse over the issue by offering generous autonomy to the area (including not only an elected local  administration but also ideas about education and justice and the promise of financial support). Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as thecurrency. The regional authority, meanwhile, would have broad powers over local administration, the economy, infrastructure,social and cultural affairs, and the environment. No less senior a U.S. official than Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has described the autonomy proposal as “serious, credible, and realistic.”

From “Morocco’s Momentum” by J. Peter Pham, Journal of International Security Affairs. Spring/Summer 2012

Since the ”Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” was released by Rabat in 2007, the Moroccan government, and their lobbyists and fellow travelers in the U.S., have united behind the proposal, portraying it as a noble and generous compromise to once and for all end the thorny Western Sahara crisis. I quote the above paragraph from a recent article by J. Peter Pham because it is typical of the deceptive and dishonest pro-autonomy material flooding the media of late.

The paragraph begins with the predictable pro-Moroccan spin: “Likewise even the touchy issue of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara has seen forward movement. In 2007, the government advanced a proposal to break the long-standingimpasse over the issue by offering generous autonomy to the area….”

Pham’s painting Morocco’s offer of autonomy as “forward movement” is puzzling given that the Polisario Front has categorically and adamantly rejected the proposal and refuses even to discuss it.  Furthermore, the series of meetings between the parties organized by UN Personal Envoy Christopher Ross in the wake of Rabat’s autonomy proposal have failed miserably to bring the parties closer together. With pro-independence demonstrations in the occupied territory becoming increasingly frequent and confrontational and with the Polisario’s renewed contemplation of a return to arms, it is much easier to see Morocco’s autonomy proposal as contributing to a deterioration of the issue.

Similarly, Pham’s proposition that Morocco is “offering generous autonomy to the area” is pure unadulterated spin. Morocco can offer anything it wants, but unless the offer includes independence as an option it is clearly incompatible with widely accepted international law, is unlikely to be considered by the Polisario and the Western Saharans, and if forced on the region is unlikely to work.  And, of course, Morocco took independence off the table years ago. The Moroccan Initiative is nothing more than a ploy to get international legitimization for its illegal occupation.

Having informed us of the generosity of Morocco’s proposal, Pham continues: “Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as the currency.”  This is the point where Pham’s commentary spins out of control and lurches over the line from spin into flat out dishonesty. Anyone who has actually read the Moroccan Initiative knows that what Pham is saying here just isn’t true. Even more damning, it is far from the truth.  Items 13 and 14 of the Moroccan Initiative deal specifically with the proposed division of powers between the autonomous region and Rabat:

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas.  Resources will come, in particular, from:

· taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region’s competent authorities;
· proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources allocated to the Region;
· the share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region;
· the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
· proceeds from the Region’s assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

· the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
· the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
· national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
· external relations;
· the Kingdom’s juridical order.

While the major statement of those areas in which the State “shall keep exclusive jurisdiction” is contained in Item 14, I have also included Item 13 for what it has to say about control of natural resource income.  In particular, I point to the statement that, “[financial] Resources will come, in particular, from … the share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region;” What this tells me is that Rabat envisions retaining control over the Western Sahara’s natural resources and doling out a portion to the region. In other words, income from the Western Saharan phosphate mines – which alone would make an independent Western Sahara one of the largest phosphate exporters in the world – would continue to flow to Rabat. Similarly, it appears that revenues from fishing licenses sold to foreign states to fish in Western Saharan waters would also be retained by Rabat. And if oil is one day discovered in Western Saharan waters, anyone who thinks that the autonomous region would get a fair share of the revenues has probably been smoking too much Rifian hashish.

While Pham for some reason identifies only the “currency” as “an attribute of sovereignty” that would be retained by Rabat, the Initiative goes much farther specifying “the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency.”

The next category of Item 14 is totally ignored by Pham: “the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;” Keep in mind that, even with the recent constitutional changes, Morocco is still a far cry from a western-style constitutional monarchy such as Spain or the UK. The crown retains the bulk of the power in the country. This assertion of the primacy of the King’s constitutional prerogatives means that democracy in the region would be just as flawed as in the rest of Morocco, and the Crown would have carte blanche to interfere as it deemed necessary in the autonomous region’s affairs. Similarly, Pham’s ignoring the bit about the religious prerogatives of the King is inexcusable since the hundreds of thousands of Sahrawi who despise the King and resent his authority would chafe mightily at any assertion of these religious prerogatives.

Of the next areas reserved for Rabat, “national security, external defense” and “external relations” appear to be adequately covered by Pham under “defense and foreign affairs.”  He ignores, however, Rabat’s exclusive jurisdiction over “defense of territorial integrity.” Inclusion of this specific item in the Initiative means to me that the Crown retains the right to prevent the autonomous region from seceding. And I think it is fair to assume that ultimately what this means is that Rabat would have the right to cancel autonomy if “territorial integrity” were threatened.  And if you believe, as I do, that any imaginable autonomy plan is doomed to failure, this is not a very encouraging feature.

Finally, Pham totally ignores the Initiative’s keeping “the Kingdom’s juridical order” within Rabat’s exclusive jurisdiction. Given the Kingdom’s notoriously corrupt and non-independent judiciary, this is likewise a recipe for disaster. The judiciary could and would overrule anything in the autonomous region the Crown found objectionable.

Again, it is not my purpose here to give a comprehensive critique of the Moroccan Initiative. That is a topic for another day, because there are just too many things seriously wrong with the plan. My purpose is to highlight the extent to which pro-Moroccan commentators, and specifically J. Peter Pham, have been systematically lying about the autonomy plan to make if more palatable for US policymakers.

Once again, Pham informs us that “Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as the currency.” In recap, he neglects to inform us that under the plan, control of natural resources, all the attributes of sovereignty, constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, defense of territorial integrity, and the juridical order would also remain in Rabat’s control. The autonomy plan is far from being “generous.”

In conclusion, I think a short comment is in order about why I like to pick on J. Peter Pham so much. After all, he is hardly the only one out there lying about Morocco’s autonomy plan.  Former Congressman and notorious Sahrawi hater Tom Lantos, for instance, characterized the plan even more dishonestly than Pham at a 2007 Congressional hearing: “Only external security and foreign affairs will be controlled by the central Moroccan government.” Right.  It’s just that Pham, as director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, is a widely known and visible Africa scholar who is very much a professional researcher. When he gets something very very wrong (like he does with the autonomy proposal), I think you can be confident that it is not because he has done sloppy or lazy research, but because he is pushing some agenda. In other words, I am totally sure that he has thoroughly read the Moroccan Initiative, and he just chooses to lie about it. Of course, this begs the question of what his agenda is. Is it a zionist thing? The fact that the quote under discussion here appeared in the in-house rag of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), a right-wing zionist think tank, might support this thesis. Or is it the neo-con thing? His thoroughly inconsistent support of South Sudanese independence and simultaneous rejection of the far more justifiable independence of the Western Sahara might support this idea. Or is he just a Moroccophile? I. William Zartman’s faulty research on the Western Sahara would be a precedent here.  Or is it a Jarch Capital thing (more on this at a later date)? Who knows? What I do know is that he gets a lot of things seriously wrong on the Western Sahara, and he should be held accountable.

In the end, however, the important point is that NO autonomy plan will work. Whether autonomy is as good as Pham would have us believe or whether it is a bad as the actual Initiative, the Sahrawis are unlikely to accept it given their long history of opposing Moroccan rule.

The New York City Bar Association recently came out with a marvelous study on the legal aspects of the Western Sahara crisis, "The Legal Issues Involved in the Western Sahara Dispute: the Principle of Self-Determination and the Legal Claims of Morocco." The study concludes that “any plan which eliminates the independence option for the exercise of self-determination is illegitimate under well-established international law” and “limiting the choice of the people of Western Sahara to the Moroccan “Autonomy Plan”does not comply with international law.” In their “Recommendations for a Way Forward,” they offer up a very sober and realistic set of options for once and for all resolving the crisis:

 (1) Enforcement of the original U.N.-OAU Settlement Plan:

Under this alternative, the referendum would be conducted by MINURSO in accordance with the provisions of the Settlement Plan agreed to by the parties to the conflict, and the list of eligible voters established by MINURSO, under the supervision of the Security Council and the AU, and consistent with internationally recognized legal norms.

(2) Enforcement of a version of the Peace Plan, or an alternative plan which provides for an act of self-determination with an option for independence, and which ensures that the electorate will be those entitled to the right to self-determination under international law; Under this alternative, a referendum would ultimately be held which includes – among other options – a ballot option for independence. The contours and the specifics could vary, so long as the provisions are aimed at ensuring that the decision is made by the “people” of Western Sahara.

(3) Order negotiations on a “political solution” with preconditions, which include (1) the requirement that all options for self-determination be included, including independence, and (2) a timetable for such negotiations, after which, if no agreement is reached, a referendum will be held with all options available.

SISTERS FOR FIVE DAYS. BY MOHAMEDSALEM WERAD

Sisters for five days

This is not a fiction movie title or a gloomy novel’s title aimed to provoke the readers’ tears. Unfortunately it’s a true story, a
tragic humanitarian story of the separation of two Saharawi sisters.This article will deal with their forceful separation, and all the moments that followed until their long awaited renuion, and finally their desperate hope for one permanent union.

Two walls divide Saharawi families in the occupied territories from those in the refugee camps. The first is the physical barrier the Moroccans have built, long berms of sand filled with land mines. The second, more excruciating wall is that of shame. Many people who live in the camps they have never met their family members on the other
side of the wall.

The two sisters’ separation started directly after the 1975 joint Moroccan-Mauritian invasion of Western Sahara. Fatama, the younger sister, fled Western Sahara to the barren Algerian desert. Her older sister Aichatu stayed in the occupied territories with their very old, frail father, half paralyzed from a hard life. 17 years old, Fatama was relived to reach the camps after a perilous journey. She had spent four days and four nights on foot laboring through the desert with
Moroccan fighters hovering in the sky above them, dropping bombs to demolish even the slightest blade of grass rustled by the wind. Any moving object was a target, so Fatama and the hundreds of other fleeing Saharawis traveled as secretly as possible.

Though safe from shells in the refugee camps, young and bright Fatama had to face the savage conditions of the scorched Sahara desert. The hammada showed no mercy to the young girl, and without her older sister, who had cared for her for the 10 years since their mother’s death, Fatama had to start over. With the help of some distant relatives, she managed to find a decent life in the camps, even getting married in her third year and bearing a son a year later.
Throughout the seventeen years of the war, neither of the sisters had any idea about the other’s destiny, or if she was even still alive. They had heard nothing of each other.

The Polisario Front and the Moroccan kingdom agreed to a ceasefire in 1991, brokered so that a referendum could take place on Western Sahara’s future. In preparation, Saharawi tribal leaders visited both sides of the berms to determine who is eligible to vote; a narrow ray of hope shone through the long winter of despair. Fatama would finally hear news of her sister and father. She was happy to learn of her family’s fate after sixteen years without learning anything, but
scared that the news would not be pleasant. She had never had the luxury of hearing about their day-to-day lives, so she wanted any news, good or bad.

As she expected, the news was bittersweet. Her sister was still alive and had five sons, but their father had died six years earlier. Her sister’s sons ask her about who he was, never able to meet their grandfather. Once or twice she told them who the man in the photo was, but it hurt to bad to explain why he was absent and why they had never
met him. Fatama fought the tears of hearing about her father’s death,  but in the end she lost. Sixteen years of grief and mourning engulfed her, and her simple hope to hug her father one last time was smothered forever. Before she heard the news, she had felt weak at times, and she had always re-energized herself with hope of seeing her father
again, but that source of strength was gone. In her hysteric sadness, she wondered why even the bad news had to be delayed so excruciatingly long.

In 2000, the first telephone landlines were installed in the camps. For the first time in 25 years, Fatama heard her sister’s
voice. They held a long and heartbreaking conversation, almost a full hour, but they wept together more than they talked. They wanted to talk every day, but of course, with lines of other equally anxious refugee families lining up to reforge long-lost connections with their occupied brothers and sisters, it was impossible for them to communicate very frequently. Normally selfless Fatama wished to be selfish and cut to the front of the long lines, and it was difficult for her to maintain patience for even one day in her life. Of course, only a moment peering at her companions’ worried faces made her feel
great shame from her impatience. 

In 2006, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) launched the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) program, which allowed the divided families to visit each other for five days. Immediately after hearing of the new program, Fatama registered her family on the list. That same day, she bought a new radio and began listening to

Saharawi national radio religiously, hoping to hear her and her sister’s names announced on air. For four years, she held her hope, and finally the UNCHR workers came to inform her that her sister would come on the next trip. It was the happiest news she had received in 21 years. However, three times the UNCHR workers came to her to with the
disappointing news of her sister’s delay. Fatama snapped, “No wonder you lie. You are part of the organization that told us to lay our weapons down, promising to organize a referendum and let us vote on our future. 15 years have passed and we are still waiting for you to do nothing!”

In 2010, her sister visit was finally confirmed. She was happy but of course skeptical about the UN’s word and habit of breaking promises. Even in her uncertain state, she started preparing for the most important event in her life. After 35 years of separation, she would finally meet her sister. Her frigid emotions moved, and scenes of their last time together flooded her mind. The next morning, with many family friends, Fatama stood, waiting for her sister’s arrival. Finally, the truck stooped to a halt. Fatama searched for her sister’s face for only a few seconds before she spotted her face. They held
each other and wept. Their embrace and was short-lived, disrupted by the crowd of her family, all there to welcome Aichatu.

The two sisters wished nothing but to have a family private reunion to huge each other again ,talk and enjoy being together after so many years of separation, but it was the costume to have the families friends and neighbors with you in the sad occasion as well as the happy ones, all that time Fatama kept staring and watching her sister in disbelief that they are in the same place but she have to wait for the visitors to be going so she can talk and fill their  hungry for seeing her sister.

Their five days together were busy, punctuated by dozens coming to say hello and ask about their family in the occupied territories. The only time that the two sisters had alone together was in late evening, after dinner and in the early morning. They tried to share everything that had occurred in each of their lives in the previous 35 years, since so much had changed in their lives. Fatama was now a mother of two girls and four boys. Two of the boys had finished their education,
the two girls were high school students, and one of her sons was a soldier. The youngest one was in fourth grade. They recalled most of the past too. They remembered their childhood and their many happy days with their father. After a while, they realized that though they  knew much of each others’ past and present, no mention of the future had been made.

The five days passed faster than light, the fastest in both of their lives. The temporary reunion was over and Aichatu had to depart. It was a sad moment for the two sisters and for everyone else there to say goodbye to Aichatu. Ali, Fatama’s son, was terribly sorry for his  mother. He had recognized the choked sorrow on his mother’s face for years and the joy her sister’s visit had brought. Ali’s friend was in disbelief to see his friend weeping has his aunt departed for the
occupied homeland. He asked if those five short days had been enough to make him cry like, a miracle in his mind. Ali cleared the grief from his throat and answered the provocative question.

“What makes me cry is my mother’s tears. I did not spend enough time with my aunt to be so attached to her. I was afraid to come to love her in these five days and then have to bear the agony of missing her forever, without the ability to see her again. This UN visit program is a bribe, a scheme to buy Saharawi patience. They think that
giving us the chance to see our families will cow us into bearing this miserable situation for years to come, no one knows how many.” 

This story is not unique. It is not even the worst in the camps. Fatama and Aichatu’s story is widely repeated in many Saharawi families. Likewise, Ali’s reaction is broadly shared by young people, a fact which should be easily understood, given that an entire generation comes to know their families through faded photos and crackling voices on the telephone. A few are lucky enough to meet their brothers, sisters, grandfathers, and grandmothers but never for
more than five days. This division of families is a huge source of anger in Saharawi youth, and it could be exploited to take up arms at anytime. This anger will only be defused when the Saharawi nation is offered the opportunity of self-determination and the ability to decide its destiny.
mohamedsalem210@gmail.com

Liberados en Mali los dos cooperantes españoles y la italiana secuestrados hace nueve meses

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Fotografía de archivo de 23/10/2011 de la española Ainhoa Fernández de Rincón.EFE/ARCHIVO

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RTVE.ES / AGENCIAS - BAMAKO 18.07.2012 - 17:15h

Los dos cooperantes españoles Ainhoa Fernández de Rincón y Enric Gonyalons y la italiana Rossella Urru, que fueron secuestrados en octubre en el campo de refugiados saharauis de Tinduf por el grupo terrorista Movimiento de Unicidad y Yihad en África del Oeste (MUYAO), han sido liberados en Mali, según ha confirmado a TVE el Ejecutivo español, que ha fletado un avión para repatriarlos.

Según las fuentes del Gobierno, que no han revelado detalles del lugar en el que los cooperantes han sido liberados, se ha enviado un helicóptero para trasladar a los tres a la zona a donde se ha desplazado el avión, una operación que se ha retrasado por una tormenta.

El portavoz del grupo radical islámico Ansar al Din, Sanda Uld, ha avanzado que los tres se encuentran ya en manos de mediadores de Burkina Faso.

En una primera valoración de esta operación, el Gobierno ha considerado que se trata de un éxito del servicio exterior del Estado y ha destacado la colaboración con los gobiernos de la zona.

Traslado de uno de los secuestradores preso

La agencia mauritana de noticias ANI había informado este miércoles de que el saharaui Mamine uld Evghir, preso en Nuakchot por su presunta implicación en el secuestro de los cooperantes y cuya liberación era una de las condiciones exigidas por el grupo para poner fin al mismo, había sido trasladado desde la cárcel a un lugar desconocido.

Un movimiento que la agencia interpretaba como el posible preludio del fin del cautiverio.

No obstante, el portavoz de la organización Ansar Al Din, quien ha informado en un primer momento de la liberación de Fernández, ha asegurado a Efe que no había habido condiciones.

El portavoz de Ansar al Din ha explilcado a Reuters que los tres secuestrados habían sido puestos en libertad en la región de Gao, situada a unos 1.200 kilómetros al noreste de la capital maliense, Bamako. También ha añadido que creía que los tres estaban en manos de mediadores de Burkina Faso.

Un portavoz de MUYAO, citado por la agencia francesa AFP, también ha confirmado la liberación de tres personas "en un país musulmán" y que sus "condiciones" se habían "cumplido", en alusión al pago de un posible rescate, aunque no ha querido especificar el importe. En mayo, MUYAO había exigido el pago de 30 millones de euros. 

Liberación de diplomáticos

La liberación se produce justo una semana después de que el mismo grupo, escindido de Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico, soltara a tres de los siete diplomáticos argelinos que mantenía también retenidos desde el 5 de abril.

Tanto el Gobierno español como el argelino y el italiano han llevado las negociaciones con MUYAO sobre la liberación de los rehenes con rigurosa discreción.

Tras la liberación de los tres diplomáticos de Argelia, el portavoz del ministerio de Exteriores argelino, Amar Belani, se limitó a confirmar a Efe su liberación y a asegurar que sus cuatro colegas permanecían retenidos en el norte de Mali.

Las gestiones para la liberación de los cooperantes españoles y la italiana se complicaron tras el golpe militar registrado en Mali a finales de marzo, cuando el ministro de Exteriores, José Manuel García-Margallo reconoció que se estaba "muy cerca" de lograr una solución al secuestro.

Según explicó el ministro, el intermediario con el que estaba trabajando el Gobierno español para liberar a Gonyalons y a Fernández "desapareció" después de que los militares sublevados se hicieran con el poder.

Exteriores continuó con las gestiones que estaba llevando a cabo y que implicaban tender puentes con el Movimiento Nacional para la Liberación de Azawad (MNLA), el grupo independentista tuareg que controla la mitad norte de Mali.

El pasado 6 de abril el MNLA proclamó la independencia del Estado de Azawad, que abarca una superficie de casi dos veces España.

Western Sahara: France position is "that defended by UN" - APS : Algérie Presse Service

ALGIERS – France position regarding Western Sahara is "that defended by UN," French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius affirmed Monday in Algiers.

"Our position regarding Western Sahara issue is that advocated by the United Nations," Fabius told a news conference Press held in France ambassador residence.

"We are in line of the international legality as defended by the UN," said the French minister.

Unanimously adopted, on April 24, Resolution 2204 states that the UN Security Council "calls on the parties (Polisario Front and Morocco) to continue negotiations under the auspices of UN Secretary General, without preconditions and in good faith to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable, which allows determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter ".

The resolution, which was extended by one year the mandate of the UN Mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), calls, furthermore, the Moroccan authorities to "improve the situation of human rights" in the occupied Saharawi territories.

Western Sahara is the last colony in Africa. It is considered non-autonomous territory by the UN since 1966.

Dakhla: an example of “Moroccanisation” of Western Sahara » Tindouf ExPRESS

Dakhla, or ad-Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros under Spanish rule), is a city in the south-west of Western Sahara, built on the Rio de Oro peninsula on the Atlantic Coast. With its approximately 58,000 inhabitants (according to the Moroccan population census of 2004), it is an economically important trading port.

In fact, the main economic activity of the city, fishing, is linked to the seaport (recently built and currently widening). Every year, Dakhla alone produces about 40% of Moroccan fish and its seaport used to host the 120 European fishing boats that were authorized to fish in the territorial waters of the occupied Western Sahara according to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (2006-2011).

In addition to seaport activities, the agricultural sector is developing more and more thanks to the fruit and vegetables production. It is the second largest economic activity of the city but, like fishing, it is closely related to bilateral trade with the European market. In fact, in the vicinity of Dakhla there are two European farms that produce cérise tomatoes for the European market thanks to the EU-Morocco Agriculture Free Trade Agreement(2012), exploiting fields and water resources of the Western Sahara occupied territories. The French farmTawarta, of the Idyl group, currently works on 60 hectares of land, while other farms linked to the French groupAzura are spread on a total surface of 76 hectares. The tomatoes produced will eventually be exported and, once in France, they will be distributed to the other European countries with the label “Produit du Maroc” starting from next September (because of a delay of Morocco in signing the Agreement). At the moment, Morocco uses 1000 hectares of land in the occupied Western Sahara, but as the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture expects larger trading incomes in the future, a big expansion of the cropped soil (which hasn’t been quantified yet) is planned within the end of 2013.

In this framework of extreme developmentalism and radical “Moroccanisation” that concerns the city of Dakhla and the main urban centers of the occupied Western Sahara, Lilia Blaise (Réalités ONLINE) explains how, during her stay in Dakhla, she could observe the strategic approach of authorities, institutions and local community to the “Saharawi question”.

For example, during her visit to the Dakhla Regional Radio, Blaise tells that the director of the radio station talked complacently about how they had recently treated the theme of the Moroccan government withdrawing its support to Christopher Ross (UN Secretary-General Personal Envoy for Western Sahara), and that he boasted about their ability to involve citizens and politicians in debates about culture, politics and religion, which are important but very delicate issues. Nevertheless, when Blaise asked about the possibility of participating in the debate for those in Dakhla who demand independence, the director only answered: “I don’t know any independentist or separatist Saharawi in Dakhla”. This seems to be a customary refrain, as the tourist guide of Blaise, Meimouna, on the first day of her visit stated without hesitation: “Everyone here wants to be Moroccan, and those who don’t, leave to the camps [the refugee camps near Tindouf, editor’s note]. Even the citizens of Dakhla that Blaise met during her official visits to the various citizenship associations (for women and development, for children, for the elderly, etc.) always introduce themselves as “pure Moroccan citizens.”

The Museum and the Multimedia Library of Saharawi people, then, seem to be set up with the sole purpose of legitimizing the annexation de facto of Western Sahara to the Kingdom of Morocco. Here, documents of the Spanish and French colonization are kept together with photos of the visits of King Mohamed VI to the “Southern Provinces”, and with the “peaceful” event of the Green March with which the King wanted to “regain the southern provinces occupied by the Spanish”. No reference to the fight of the Saharawis against the Spanish domination, to the Polisario Front, to the proclamation of the birth of the RASD, to the conspicuous and unequivocal legal production of United Nations about the military invasion by Morocco… The “Saharawi question” and the long history of what we call today the “Saharan Morocco” seem to be reduced to a brief historical hint about the Saharawi population:

“composed of two clans: the Ouled Dhims and the Rguibats (…) Therefore, the tribal structure of the Saharan Morocco’s society makes independence totally impossible, because if these tribes became independent, they would start a bloody war for power”.
(interview by Lilia Blaise, Réalités ONLINE, 06/28/2012)

Neither do the words of (Wali) Hamid Chabar, governor of the Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira region of which Dakhla is the capital, open the way for a reflection about the complex problem of self-determination for Saharawi people:

“the conflict in Western Sahara today is just a diplomatic question, an ideological conflict that surpasses all the rest (…) In Dakhla I would like to build a wealthy regional center, at the edge of Sub-Saharan Africa, a crossroad of very important trade flows”.
(op. cit.)

Wali Chabar imagines a wealthy regional pole at the forefront of technology, also thanks to the use of “sustainable energy”. In fact, it is no secret that the EU is investing huge capitals in the development of wind power and photovoltaic factories in the whole Maghreb region, and in particular in Morocco and Algeria. In such context, even the United Nations promoted the Foum El Oued Farm Project, in the framework of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) defined in the Kyoto Protocol. The Foum implies the installation of 44 wind turbines of 2,3 Megawatts in an area included in the city of El Ayoun, in the occupied Western Sahara.

If the United Nations actually gave their financing to NAREVA Holding, which promotes the project together with Siemens, once more we would see the paradox of a situation of military occupation and exploitation of national resources that has been judged as illegitimate many times, but is endorsed de facto by the international community and by the western powers. The European Union and, in this case, even the United Nations, historically committed to the promotion and safeguard of human rights and international law, would be once more (un)consciously responsible for the economic exploitation of a militarily occupied land.

Furthermore, NAREVA Holding is controlled by the Moroccan royal family; this means that the business would be once more to the benefit of King Mohamed VI and his inner circle of friends and relatives. For this reason, too, apart from the sanctioned prohibition to continue the exploitation of a non-autonomous territory’s resources, many famous people intervened to ask the Secretary of UNFCCC to revise the political and financial support to the project.

Translation by Lucrezia De Carolis