Responses to Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains | Middle East Institute

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Responses to: Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains

I applaud Mr. Gabriel’s desire to reach a solution to the conflict over Western Sahara, which is urgently necessary to stop the suffering of the Saharawi people, who are either treated as second-class citizens without freedom of speech and freedom of movement in an occupied territory, or living impoverished lives in refugee camps far away from their homeland. I also agree that a definite resolution of the conflict will remove one of the greatest obstacles to promoting greater stability, economic prosperity and cooperation in the Maghreb region, and that because of this the United States should play a more active role.

Where I disagree is with Mr. Gabriel’s attempt to portray the Polisario as the obstacle to peace.  Whether or not Morocco would ever be forced to give up its illegal occupation of Western Sahara is a matter of conjecture. What is certain is that no country in the world recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Not the United States, and not France, supposedly Morocco’s biggest ally. In fact, the African Union has even granted full membership to the government in exile of Western Sahara, thereby recognizing Western Sahara as an independent African state.

It is also completely disingenuous to present Morocco’s proposal for limited autonomy as a magnanimous compromise, when it is no such thing. Far from compromising, Morocco persists in pursuing its original aim ― the complete annexation of Western Sahara. If Morocco’s proposal was such a compromise, the UN Security Council would surely have endorsed it unreservedly and called on the parties to implement it. But the Council did not, because Morocco’s proposal is completely inconsistent with the “basic criteria for self-determination” that even Mr. Gabriel acknowledges must be taken into account. Having people participate in a “referendum” where they are asked simply to confirm their approval of a single choice is akin to holding an election in North Korea and calling it genuine. I note in passing that it is ironic that Mr. Gabriel, who as a former US Ambassador must surely have been instructed to extol the virtues of freedom and democracy, should now expend so much energy opposing a free and fair vote in Western Sahara. Those who are most afraid of allowing free votes are those who don’t want to accept the outcome they know will emerge, and it is they who are usually the biggest enemies of peace and democracy. The organization of a free vote in which the Sahrawi people are given a genuine choice is not a “winner take all” solution ― just the opposite. 

Let us remember that Western Sahara was designated by the United Nations in 1963 as a Non Self Governing Territory which under international law is required to undergo a process of de-colonization. Morocco subverted that process for its own aims, and we are still living with the consequences of that today. But the Saharawi population’s right to self-determination is undiminished. This is not my judgment ― the right to self-determination lies at the core of international human rights law, so fundamental in fact that it is referenced in article 1 of the human rights covenants. Mr. Gabriel’s casual attempt to denigrate the importance of this right by placing it in quotation marks does not change its inalienability. The pursuit of self-determination is what led many nations in the world to their independence, including the United States. It is this key principle that still informs the mandate of the UN Mission in Western Sahara, which is given renewed legitimacy by the Security Council every year. One of the primary functions of the UN Mission is to organize the conduct of a referendum of the Saharawi people to enable them to freely choose their own future. Despite its presence in Western Sahara for over twenty years this has still not happened.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Gabriel chooses to ignore these facts and instead presents the current Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara as an “absolute reality.” It would be helpful to remember that the International Court of Justice ruling in 1975 clearly established that Morocco had no ties of territorial sovereignty to Western Sahara. Attempts to ignore this and instead support measures to formalize an unlawful Moroccan occupation would not only constitute a deeply damaging and destabilizing precedent in international law, but also have knock-on effects in other conflict situations. Basing a solution entirely on so-called “political reality” or facts on the ground, without reference to accepted international law is not only deeply cynical, but also completely impractical. One only has to look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to see this.

Instead, sincere and renewed efforts must be made to reach a solution that is compatible with the fundamental precepts of international law and the previous agreements between the parties, not least the 1991 Settlement Plan agreed between Morocco and Polisario. The only fair middle-ground to this conflict is therefore to organize a free vote of the Saharawi people, which includes as options the Moroccan proposal for limited autonomy as well as the possibility of establishing a free and independent state of West Sahara. Such an approach would recognize the Moroccan initiative as a possible solution to the conflict, while not ruling out the existence of other proposals, which could more accurately reflect the wishes of the people who lie at the heart of this dispute. Moroccan intransigence should not be allowed to obstruct the peace process and prevent the Saharawi people from exercising their fundamental right to self-determination.

-Carne Ross

Ambassador Gabriel’s discussion of the about the impasse on the Western Sahara question within the Security Council that has prevailed almost since the origin contribution is both candid and realistic. For almost 40 years, a number of UN secretary generals, personal envoys, special representatives, and under-secretary generals from the department of peace-keeping operations or political affairs, have been in charge of this dossier, but have been unable to break the deadlock. The impasse has had regrettable consequences for the people, who remain in refugee camps. It has also had a negative impact on the development of the Maghreb region as well as on the long-term stability of the countries concerned.

Even if I believe Carne Ross to be motivated not only by his links with the Polisario Front but also by his genuine ethical approach of diplomacy, I concur with Ambassador Gabriel that any solution which reverts to inapplicable documents or failed recipes would impede progress. There are those who benefit from the status quo — whose power and advantages are preserved by the lack of an electoral process or democratic accountability. In this context, the then immovable Minister of Interior of Morocco, Driss Basri, knew that the status quo was an effective way to maintain his grip and influence in the country.

Martin Indyk, former US Assistant Secretary of State, in an interview with the Moroccan weekly Le Journal Hebdomadaire acknowledged, in September 2009, that King Hassan II was convinced of the necessity of embracing the notion of autonomy for Western Sahara. As I wrote in my May 21 essay, I personally came to this same conclusion, though I know that there were strong opponents to such a move in both camps. It seems to me that US Secretary of State James Baker shared this feeling in 2000 adding nevertheless that some form of referendum should conclude the process leading to autonomy so as to preserve a link with the original plan.

Members of the UN Security Council, while playing their traditional part in what looks like a theatrical performance, never showed any appetite for change or readiness to turn the table back in order to impose a deadline as well as conditions for a self-determination referendum. Carne Ross appears to be helpless as it is a stillborn proposal due to the fierce opposition of France and the United States to any approach that could potentially undermine the stability of Morocco or risk compromising their relations with Algeria. Furthermore, with the passivity of the large majority of the Security Council, no other country is ready to counter this policy as almost all of them, openly or secretly, have for long shared this prudent policy. The most evident demonstration is that nothing has happened since I left the UN Headquarters on September 30, 2000.

Would it be wise to re-ignite a debate on this question after 35 years of procrastination in the Security Council? Would it make sense to provoke tensions within the African Union or even risk further instability in the sub-Saharan and Sahel region, which has seen Islamist extremists seize control of northern Mali?

Is it constructive to refuse any other avenue than the only one that has irremediably demonstrated its inanity since the origin? Is it opportune to reject any discussion or dialog, while seeing despair in the Sahrawi refugee camps and knowing that it would last for years or decades to come? These are the real questions to consider and issues to solve.

Ambassador Gabriel’s suggestion to press the US Government to discuss afresh this matter with Algeria and Morocco is useful in light of the risks of destabilizing the sub-region. As the new French administration is also willing to have a balanced and positive relationship with both Rabat and Algiers, Paris and Washington could combine efforts to impress on Algeria ― whose influence remains critical in this process ― the need to move forward on the Western Sahara issue as well as to convince Rabat of the merits of a genuine dialog on the relevance and content of autonomy.

-Bernard Miyet

The case for Western Saharan independence | Western Sahara Update

Western Sahara, Africa’s last colony, is perhaps the most clear-cut case for independence in the world today. It is unfortunately also one of the lesser known conflicts. Western Sahara has been illegally occupied by Morocco since 1975, when a weakened Spain, anxious to avoid military confrontation, had secretly relinquished Western Sahara to Morocco (and Mauritania, who left its part of Western Sahara to Morocco in 1979) in exchange for mining and fishing concessions. As an illegal occupying force, Morocco has no right to the territory of Western Sahara, and nor has it the right to sell Western Sahara’s natural resources or violate the human rights of its citizens, but must instead work towards the a referendum on the status of Western Sahara. So international law fully supports the Saharawis’ claim to independence for Western Sahara.

No country accepts Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara, on the other hand, but over 80 countries recognise Western Sahara’s exile government, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR government is a member of the African Union and has a President, a Prime Minister, a judiciary, and ministerial departments and a parliament, just as any other country in the world, although because of Morocco’s occupation of most of Western Saharan territory, SADR is administrated from a refugee camp in the middle of the dessert in Western Algeria.

The Saharawi people and SADR seem to be coping remarkably well in these circumstances, although they would obviously be coping significantly better if they had access to the bulk of their resources and land that is presently colonised by Morocco. The educational level in the camps, for instance, is surprisingly high, mainly because the SADR government has made education a priority. About 90% of the population are literate, against a regional average of about 50%, a dramatic rise from the 10% literacy when the Saharawis arrived in the camps in 1975. Saharawian women are also seen as some of the most liberated in the Arab and Muslim world. And as the president of the American Defence Forum Foundation, Suzanne Scholte, concluded recently, “Western Sahara has the greatest potential of any Arab country to become a pro-Western democracy.” So why hasn’t Western Sahara been granted its independence?

There is both a purely legal and a moral case for Western Saharan independence, as well as a real-political reason that Western Sahara is still colonised by Morocco.

The legal case

There is a multitude of international court opinions, legal opinions, legal charters and UN-resolutions that support the claim of the Saharawis to Western Sahara.

The International Court of Justice rejected Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara in October 1975, a month before Morocco invaded, its opinion concluding, “that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco.” Self-determination for Western Sahara (defined as the right of a people to a free choice) constituted a “basic assumption of the questions put to the court”, and even a positive finding of ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco would therefore not have overrided the self-determination process.

The illegality of Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara has been maintained by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly in over 100 resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 1514 that states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” and that “immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.” Resolution 1514 was declared applicable to the case of Western Sahara by UN General Assembly Resolution 2229.

The Charter of the United Nations (article 3) also clearly states that those nations who are “responsible” for non-self-governing states, such as Western Sahara, must “ensure … their just treatment, and their protection against abuses,” “take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples,” “promote constructive measures of development,” and “transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes,” none of which Morocco can be said to be doing presently.

Morocco’s instigation of the “Green March” in late 1975, where over 300.000 civilian Moroccans marched into Western Sahara was clearly in breach of the 4^th Geneva Convention’s article 49 that states that “the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

Self-determination of nations such as Western Sahara, including their natural resources, was recognised as a principle in article 1, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that reads “All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources … based upon the principle of … international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” Regarding Western Sahara’s resources, former Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Hans Correll’s UN Opinion from 2002 concluded that the selling of Western Sahara’s resources was only legal if the population of Western Sahara agrees to and benefits from it, something a European Parliament Legal Opinion from 2009 and numerous statements from Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Western Sahara’s government in exile, conclude they do not. Correll has recently reiterated this conclusion, saying, “if the [fisheries] agreement is not signed with the interest of the people of Western Sahara, or after consultation with them, and the benefits do not go to the people of the territory, then it would be in violation of international law. I am afraid we have this situation in this case now.” Morocco’s selling of Western Sahara’s huge deposits of phosphate, and the Fisheries Partnership Agreement that Morocco has agreed with the European Union, where the EU pays Morocco 36.1 million Euros annually to allow EU vessels to fish in its waters, is therefore illegal.

Several UN-resolutions have also specifically called for Morocco to grant Western Sahara its independence. UN General Assembly Resolution 34/37, 1979, paragraph 5, for instance, “deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco”, while paragraph 6 specifically calls upon Morocco to “… terminate the occupation of the territory of Western Sahara”

The moral case

Apart from the purely legal argument for Western Saharan independence there is also an equally strong moral argument, especially in regard to the way the Moroccan regime treats the Saharawis.

The Human Rights situation in occupied Western Sahara is highly reprehensible, something that many Human Rights organisations have accounted for in numerous reports and other publications. Human Rights Watch speaks of Moroccan authorities acting with “impunity” and the ”evidence of torture and serious mistreatment” against the indigenous population of Westerns Sahara, the Saharawis; International Crisis Group speaks of the Moroccan regime’s “disproportionate use of force” and it  “frequently resorting to torture and arbitrary arrests;” and Amnesty International speaks of Saharawis being “subjected to forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – including rape.”

Morocco has brutally clamped down on anyone within occupied Western Sahara who dares dispute its rule, however peacefully. One of the more recent and widely publicised examples of this was the Moroccan clamp down on the Saharawi Gdaim Izik protest camp in occupied Western Sahara in November 2010. Shortly hereafter, the European Parliament passed a resolution that “expresses its greatest concern about the significant deterioration of the situation in Western Sahara and strongly condemns the violent incidents which occurred in Gdaim Izyk camp while it was being dismantled and in the town of Laâyoun”. The resolution also “deplores the loss of human life” during Morocco’s brutal raid on the peaceful protest camp of Gdeim Izik, and insisted that the parliament is generally “concerned” about the human rights situation in Western Sahara.

The situation of the over 150.000 Saharawis that have lived in refugee camps outside Western Sahara since 1975 is equally reprehensible. A Moroccan-built wall, “Berm” or “wall of shame” as the Saharawis call it to, spans the entire length of Western Sahara, dividing the resource-rich occupied part from the SADR-controlled part. It is manned by thousands of soldiers and is heavily mined with around six million mines. The wall was and is an attempt by Morocco to protect the resources that they illegally extract from occupied Western Sahara. What it means for the Saharawis, apart from being a symbol of the occupation of their land, is that the families living in the refugee camps in neighbouring Algeria have been unable to visit their families in occupied Western Sahara for years on end as crossing from one part to the other is virtually impossible.

There are four large Saharawi refugee camps, as well as smaller satellite camps. The camps have a total population of around 165.000 according to UNHCR, although this number is disputed by Morocco for political reasons. The camps lie near Tindouf, Algeria, in an area known as “the devil’s garden” where temperatures in summer reach 50 degrees. The area has little vegetation and experiences frequent sand storms. Drinking water has to be brought in by lorry and many of those living there experience nutritional deficiencies.

The reality of realpolitik

So why has it taken so long for Western Sahara to gain its independence, when all other African countries have already gained theirs?

One obvious reason for this is that the UN Security Council is currently blocking any UN-sanctioned solution to the Western Sahara conflict. Especially the USA and France, both permanent UN Security Council members, have strategic and financial interests that have caused them to veto any UN action on Western Sahara. The USA, France and Spain, in particular, are not interested in changing a status quo that they believe they benefit from both strategically and financially. Furthermore, they are not pressured to act because Western Sahara is a low-intensity conflict and therefore doesn’t get much coverage in the press, although an increasingly vocal international civil society and increasing effective activism is beginning to draw attention to the Western Saharan conflict.

The governments and companies of the European Union, including Western Sahara’s former colonial power, Spain (Western Sahara’s de jure administrative power according to international law) in particular, benefit financially from the status quo. Amongst other things because of the huge but illegal presence of mostly Spanish fishing vessels in the waters of occupied Western Sahara and the illegal selling of other Western Saharan resources such as phosphates. The selling of these resources play an important part in enabling Morocco to continue to fund its colonisation of Western Sahara.

The USA and France have more strategic interests. The USA often publicly praises Morocco’s alleged reform efforts and France rarely publicly criticizes Morocco’s poor human rights record and openly supported its autonomy plan for Western Sahara, an attempt to make Western Sahara a permanent region within Morocco where Morocco retains power over defence, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the Moroccan King. Morocco was one of the USA’s closest allies in their fight against communism and is one of its main allies in its fight against terrorism. Morocco was the first country to recognize the independent United States, and the two nations also signed a treaty of friendship as long ago as in 1777 (renegotiated in 1836 and still in effect). France and the USA both provide Morocco with financial aid to back up their support.

It is also obvious that independence for Western Sahara demands some sort of change within Morocco itself, as the current Moroccan regime has issues of both self-preservation and finance at stake with regards to Western Sahara. In plain language, the present Moroccan regime and its army use Western Sahara as both a diversion from its internal problems and the dissatisfaction within the Moroccan population with the regime, and as a source of considerable income.

An outstretched hand to the Moroccan people

The Saharawis apparently understand this fact. Even though Western Sahara’s national liberation movement, the Polisario Front, were at war with Morocco between 1975 and 1991, their grudge seems to be more with the undemocratic Moroccan regime, controlled by King Mohammed, than with the Moroccan people. As SADR President, and Polisario Secretary General, Mohamed Abdelaziz said in his speech on 27 February 2011 at the 35^thanniversary celebrations of SADR in Tifariti in SADR-controlled Western Sahara, “we would also like to salute the Moroccan brotherly people and to assure them that the Saharawi people are their partner in the struggle for freedom, justice and the respect for human and peoples’ rights and in their common endeavour to build a united Maghreb, based on cooperation, integration, mutual respect and neighbourly relations between its peoples and countries … both Saharawi and Moroccan peoples are victims of the expansionism of the Moroccan Government that persists in curbing democracy and violating human rights”.

And no, I don’t think the conflict is doomed, although it might initially seem a little that way. The same insolvability seemed to apply to apartheid South Africa, where internal and external pressure broke the regime over the period of some years, and the North African regimes (specifically Tunisia and Egypt), where it was more internal pressure that broke the regimes (and where the outcome is obviously more unclear at present). All of these three countries looked nowhere near democratisation, from the outside at least, before it actually happened.

Peter Kenworthy is a Master of Social Science from Roskilde University. Peter has visited both the Tindouf refugee camps and in SADR-controlled Western Sahara, and has written a multitude of articles on the issue of Western Sahara.

“No other choice” than self-determination for Western Sahara| Western Sahara Update

“There is no other choice but self-determination,” says a lady interviewed in a new documentary about Western Sahara made by 31-year-old English independent film-maker and journalist, Dominic Brown. She is the wife of one of the many activists belonging to Western Sahara’s indigenous population, the Saharawis, who have been imprisoned and tortured for campaigning for independence for Africa’s last colony.

According to the documentary, called La Badil  (literally “no other choice”),  the Saharawis have been discriminated and systematically robbed of their resources by Morocco since a Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara in 1975 that was carried out in agreement with the colonial power Spain. Because, as a speak over in the documentary says, “Western Sahara’s abundance of natural resources provides vital revenue to the Moroccan state.”

La Badil is a documentary about the daily life of the indigenous population – the Saharawis – in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The film focuses on both Gdeim Izik, where Moroccan troops attacked a peaceful protest camp in October 2010, killing several people and detaining and torturing many more, and on the daily lives of the Saharawis.

Through footage filmed undercover from the major towns in occupied Western Sahara, as well as through interviews, the documentary portrays the Saharawis as being virtually under siege in their own country by Moroccan troops, as being beaten up and tortured for even daring to show the Saharawi flag in public, and as being discriminated against by the Moroccan authorities, companies and Moroccan settlers.

“They [the Moroccans] are reaping all the benefits from our country’s riches. The Saharawis get nothing,” as one person says in the film. “They [Moroccan police] storm our houses and kidnap our children. We are really suffering here,” says another.

But while conflicts elsewhere are more or less regularly covered in the Western media, the Western Sahara conflict is all but forgotten. “The media were almost silent when the [Gdeim Izik] uprisings occurred compared to in Libya and Tunisia, because of the blockade the Moroccan authorities imposed” as a young activist points out in the documentary. This media blockade has meant that the Saharawis have begun uploading mobile phone footage to YouTube to try and bring attention to their situation.

And this is exactly the reason why the film was made, Dominic Brown tells me. “I decided to make the film because the situation in Western Sahara is one that very rarely gets the media coverage that it deserves. Especially here in the UK, most people have no idea about what is happening there. More and more people are taking cheap flights on Easyjet to Morocco, but they don’t realise they are contributing in some way to the oppression of the Sahrawi.”

But as the documentary also points out, powerful countries such as the USA and France – and the EU as a whole – are by no means neutral. On the contrary, they are aiding and abetting Morocco in its exploitation of Western Sahara’s population and their resources by e.g. accepting Morocco’s proposal to have Western Sahara remain a Moroccan province, by denying the UN the ability to monitor the human rights situation in Western Sahara, by supplying arms to Morocco, and by illegally dealing in goods and fishing quotas from the occupied territories of Western Sahara.

“I hope that the film will open more peoples eyes to the plight of the Sahrawi, and also show how there are many vested interests involved (eg. France and their trade deals with Morocco), that are preventing the people there getting justice,” says Dominic Brown.

The message from those interviewed in the documentary to the populations and governments in the West is certainly clear: help us achieve independence from Morocco. “We just demand freedom like all people around the world,” says one lady. “We are asking for organisations in Europe to help us, both government and non-government,” pleaded another.

Dominic Brown has previously made an undercover documentary about the independence struggle in West Papua called ‘Forgotten Bird of Paradise’ that was shown on the BBC as well as screened at film festivals in 10 countries. He will be entering La Badil into film festivals as well as approaching broadcasters. In the meantime the film can be purchased here or seen here.

Learn more:

Three interviews with Saharawi Human Rights activist Bouamoud Mohamed

The Reality of Western Sahara | GlobalPost | Western Sahara Update

Commentary: A rebuttal on accusations concerning the Polisario and Moroccan occupation.

Stephen ZunesAugust 2, 2012 06:13

The wreckage of a Morrocan tank is pictured near the Western Sahara village of Tifariti. Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony which was annexed in 1975 by Morocco. The Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, wants independence for the territory on the west African coast. (Dominique Faget/AFP/Getty Images)

SAN FRANCISCO — Earlier this year, Global Post ran an article by Jordan Paul, executive director of the Moroccan American Center for Policy, a registered foreign agent for the Moroccan government, which funds, supervises, and coordinates the group’s activities. The article contained a series of demonstrably false claims attempting to rationalize for Morocco’s illegal occupation of its southern neighbor, the country of Western Sahara.

In 1975, the kingdom of Morocco conquered Western Sahara on the eve of its anticipated independence from Spain in defiance of a series of UN Security Council resolutions and a landmark 1975 decision by the International Court of Justice upholding the right of the country's inhabitants to self-determination. With threats of a French and American veto at the UN preventing decisive action by the international community to stop the Moroccan invasion, the nationalist Polisario Front launched an armed struggle against the occupiers. The majority of the indigenous population, known as Sahrawis, went into exile, primarily in Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria.

Thanks to U.S. and French military support for the conquering Moroccan forces, Morocco was able to hold on to most of Western Sahara. Yet the Polisario achieved a series of diplomatic victories that generated widespread international support for self-determination and opposition to the Moroccan takeover. In 1991, the Polisario agreed to a ceasefire in return for a Moroccan promise to allow for an internationally supervised referendum on the fate of the territory. Morocco, however, recognizing they would almost certainly lose such a plebiscite, refused to allow the scheduled vote to move forward.

French and American support for the Moroccan government blocked the UN Security Council from providing the necessary diplomatic pressure to force Morocco to allow the promised referendum to take place. The Polisario, meanwhile, recognizing its inability to defeat the Moroccans by military means, decided against resuming the armed struggle. As a result, the struggle for self-determination shifted to within the Moroccan-occupied territory, where the Sahrawi population has launched a nonviolent resistance campaign against the occupation, which – despite widespread Moroccan repression – has sporadically continued.

More from GlobalPost: Western Sahara in geopolitical state

In an effort to justify their ongoing defiance of the international community for their illegal occupation, the autocratic Moroccan monarchy has redoubled its efforts to discredit their opponents, such hiring people like Paul to write articles like those that appeared in the Global Post in March.

Among Paul’s more bizarre claims is that the Polisario Front has links to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM.)

In reality, though Sahrawis are virtually all Muslims, they historically practice a decidedly liberal interpretation of the faith. The Polisario has since its founding been a secular organization, based on the belief that religious faith is between the individual and God, not a government or other temporal organization. Women have taken prominent positions in leadership. Meanwhile, radical Islamists in Algeria have condemned them for their secular ideology and even attacked Polisario offices.

Even during the twenty years of armed struggle, the Polisario never engaged in terrorism or any kind of deliberate attacks against civilian targets. And there has been none since.

Furthermore, the autocratic Algerian regime controls security around the refugee camps, which are located in the heavily-militarized region of Tindouf. After surviving a bloody decade-long civil war against Islamist extremists, the idea that the Algerian government would allow any group collaborating the AQIM to operate in such a sensitive area is pure fantasy.

While there are some legitimate concerns regarding some of the practices of the Polisario leadership in the camps, no credible independent analysts have documented Paul’s claims that the Polisario has been involved in “arms and drug trafficking, armed incursions into Mali, fighting as Gaddafi mercenaries in Libya, and kidnappings for AQIM in the Sahel.”

Contrary to Paul’s claim, the Polisario Front is not a “separatist” group. It is the ruling party of the nation of Western Sahara – known officially as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic – which has been recognized by over 80 countries and is a full member state of the African Union. Western Sahara is recognized by the United Nations and virtually the entire international community as a non-self-governing country under foreign belligerent occupation.

And, contrary to Paul, the Polisario does not “force” the refugees to live in the camps. As someone who has visited both the camps and Moroccan-occupied parts of Western Sahara, it is clear that they are there to escape Moroccan repression in their occupied homeland, repression that has been well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other reputable human rights groups.

As with Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, and Iraq’s short-lived occupation of Kuwait, there are those who will try to justify illegitimate foreign occupations by making up such bizarre stories. However, it doesn’t mean they should be taken seriously.

More from GlobalPost: Lesbians in Morocco: Should we stay or should we go?

Stephen Zunes is a professor of Politics and chair or Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco. He is author, along with Jacob Mundy, of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse University Press, 2010) 

Western Sahara Endgame: A Tale of Deception and Dishonesty about Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara

Likewise even the touchy issue of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara has seen forward movement. In 2007, the government advanced a proposal to break the long-standing impasse over the issue by offering generous autonomy to the area (including not only an elected local  administration but also ideas about education and justice and the promise of financial support). Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as thecurrency. The regional authority, meanwhile, would have broad powers over local administration, the economy, infrastructure,social and cultural affairs, and the environment. No less senior a U.S. official than Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has described the autonomy proposal as “serious, credible, and realistic.”

From “Morocco’s Momentum” by J. Peter Pham, Journal of International Security Affairs. Spring/Summer 2012

Since the ”Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” was released by Rabat in 2007, the Moroccan government, and their lobbyists and fellow travelers in the U.S., have united behind the proposal, portraying it as a noble and generous compromise to once and for all end the thorny Western Sahara crisis. I quote the above paragraph from a recent article by J. Peter Pham because it is typical of the deceptive and dishonest pro-autonomy material flooding the media of late.

The paragraph begins with the predictable pro-Moroccan spin: “Likewise even the touchy issue of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara has seen forward movement. In 2007, the government advanced a proposal to break the long-standingimpasse over the issue by offering generous autonomy to the area….”

Pham’s painting Morocco’s offer of autonomy as “forward movement” is puzzling given that the Polisario Front has categorically and adamantly rejected the proposal and refuses even to discuss it.  Furthermore, the series of meetings between the parties organized by UN Personal Envoy Christopher Ross in the wake of Rabat’s autonomy proposal have failed miserably to bring the parties closer together. With pro-independence demonstrations in the occupied territory becoming increasingly frequent and confrontational and with the Polisario’s renewed contemplation of a return to arms, it is much easier to see Morocco’s autonomy proposal as contributing to a deterioration of the issue.

Similarly, Pham’s proposition that Morocco is “offering generous autonomy to the area” is pure unadulterated spin. Morocco can offer anything it wants, but unless the offer includes independence as an option it is clearly incompatible with widely accepted international law, is unlikely to be considered by the Polisario and the Western Saharans, and if forced on the region is unlikely to work.  And, of course, Morocco took independence off the table years ago. The Moroccan Initiative is nothing more than a ploy to get international legitimization for its illegal occupation.

Having informed us of the generosity of Morocco’s proposal, Pham continues: “Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as the currency.”  This is the point where Pham’s commentary spins out of control and lurches over the line from spin into flat out dishonesty. Anyone who has actually read the Moroccan Initiative knows that what Pham is saying here just isn’t true. Even more damning, it is far from the truth.  Items 13 and 14 of the Moroccan Initiative deal specifically with the proposed division of powers between the autonomous region and Rabat:

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas.  Resources will come, in particular, from:

· taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region’s competent authorities;
· proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources allocated to the Region;
· the share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region;
· the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
· proceeds from the Region’s assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

· the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
· the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
· national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
· external relations;
· the Kingdom’s juridical order.

While the major statement of those areas in which the State “shall keep exclusive jurisdiction” is contained in Item 14, I have also included Item 13 for what it has to say about control of natural resource income.  In particular, I point to the statement that, “[financial] Resources will come, in particular, from … the share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region;” What this tells me is that Rabat envisions retaining control over the Western Sahara’s natural resources and doling out a portion to the region. In other words, income from the Western Saharan phosphate mines – which alone would make an independent Western Sahara one of the largest phosphate exporters in the world – would continue to flow to Rabat. Similarly, it appears that revenues from fishing licenses sold to foreign states to fish in Western Saharan waters would also be retained by Rabat. And if oil is one day discovered in Western Saharan waters, anyone who thinks that the autonomous region would get a fair share of the revenues has probably been smoking too much Rifian hashish.

While Pham for some reason identifies only the “currency” as “an attribute of sovereignty” that would be retained by Rabat, the Initiative goes much farther specifying “the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency.”

The next category of Item 14 is totally ignored by Pham: “the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;” Keep in mind that, even with the recent constitutional changes, Morocco is still a far cry from a western-style constitutional monarchy such as Spain or the UK. The crown retains the bulk of the power in the country. This assertion of the primacy of the King’s constitutional prerogatives means that democracy in the region would be just as flawed as in the rest of Morocco, and the Crown would have carte blanche to interfere as it deemed necessary in the autonomous region’s affairs. Similarly, Pham’s ignoring the bit about the religious prerogatives of the King is inexcusable since the hundreds of thousands of Sahrawi who despise the King and resent his authority would chafe mightily at any assertion of these religious prerogatives.

Of the next areas reserved for Rabat, “national security, external defense” and “external relations” appear to be adequately covered by Pham under “defense and foreign affairs.”  He ignores, however, Rabat’s exclusive jurisdiction over “defense of territorial integrity.” Inclusion of this specific item in the Initiative means to me that the Crown retains the right to prevent the autonomous region from seceding. And I think it is fair to assume that ultimately what this means is that Rabat would have the right to cancel autonomy if “territorial integrity” were threatened.  And if you believe, as I do, that any imaginable autonomy plan is doomed to failure, this is not a very encouraging feature.

Finally, Pham totally ignores the Initiative’s keeping “the Kingdom’s juridical order” within Rabat’s exclusive jurisdiction. Given the Kingdom’s notoriously corrupt and non-independent judiciary, this is likewise a recipe for disaster. The judiciary could and would overrule anything in the autonomous region the Crown found objectionable.

Again, it is not my purpose here to give a comprehensive critique of the Moroccan Initiative. That is a topic for another day, because there are just too many things seriously wrong with the plan. My purpose is to highlight the extent to which pro-Moroccan commentators, and specifically J. Peter Pham, have been systematically lying about the autonomy plan to make if more palatable for US policymakers.

Once again, Pham informs us that “Under the plan, the only matters that would remain in Rabat’s control would be defense and foreign affairs as well as the currency.” In recap, he neglects to inform us that under the plan, control of natural resources, all the attributes of sovereignty, constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, defense of territorial integrity, and the juridical order would also remain in Rabat’s control. The autonomy plan is far from being “generous.”

In conclusion, I think a short comment is in order about why I like to pick on J. Peter Pham so much. After all, he is hardly the only one out there lying about Morocco’s autonomy plan.  Former Congressman and notorious Sahrawi hater Tom Lantos, for instance, characterized the plan even more dishonestly than Pham at a 2007 Congressional hearing: “Only external security and foreign affairs will be controlled by the central Moroccan government.” Right.  It’s just that Pham, as director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, is a widely known and visible Africa scholar who is very much a professional researcher. When he gets something very very wrong (like he does with the autonomy proposal), I think you can be confident that it is not because he has done sloppy or lazy research, but because he is pushing some agenda. In other words, I am totally sure that he has thoroughly read the Moroccan Initiative, and he just chooses to lie about it. Of course, this begs the question of what his agenda is. Is it a zionist thing? The fact that the quote under discussion here appeared in the in-house rag of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), a right-wing zionist think tank, might support this thesis. Or is it the neo-con thing? His thoroughly inconsistent support of South Sudanese independence and simultaneous rejection of the far more justifiable independence of the Western Sahara might support this idea. Or is he just a Moroccophile? I. William Zartman’s faulty research on the Western Sahara would be a precedent here.  Or is it a Jarch Capital thing (more on this at a later date)? Who knows? What I do know is that he gets a lot of things seriously wrong on the Western Sahara, and he should be held accountable.

In the end, however, the important point is that NO autonomy plan will work. Whether autonomy is as good as Pham would have us believe or whether it is a bad as the actual Initiative, the Sahrawis are unlikely to accept it given their long history of opposing Moroccan rule.

The New York City Bar Association recently came out with a marvelous study on the legal aspects of the Western Sahara crisis, "The Legal Issues Involved in the Western Sahara Dispute: the Principle of Self-Determination and the Legal Claims of Morocco." The study concludes that “any plan which eliminates the independence option for the exercise of self-determination is illegitimate under well-established international law” and “limiting the choice of the people of Western Sahara to the Moroccan “Autonomy Plan”does not comply with international law.” In their “Recommendations for a Way Forward,” they offer up a very sober and realistic set of options for once and for all resolving the crisis:

 (1) Enforcement of the original U.N.-OAU Settlement Plan:

Under this alternative, the referendum would be conducted by MINURSO in accordance with the provisions of the Settlement Plan agreed to by the parties to the conflict, and the list of eligible voters established by MINURSO, under the supervision of the Security Council and the AU, and consistent with internationally recognized legal norms.

(2) Enforcement of a version of the Peace Plan, or an alternative plan which provides for an act of self-determination with an option for independence, and which ensures that the electorate will be those entitled to the right to self-determination under international law; Under this alternative, a referendum would ultimately be held which includes – among other options – a ballot option for independence. The contours and the specifics could vary, so long as the provisions are aimed at ensuring that the decision is made by the “people” of Western Sahara.

(3) Order negotiations on a “political solution” with preconditions, which include (1) the requirement that all options for self-determination be included, including independence, and (2) a timetable for such negotiations, after which, if no agreement is reached, a referendum will be held with all options available.

SISTERS FOR FIVE DAYS. BY MOHAMEDSALEM WERAD

Sisters for five days

This is not a fiction movie title or a gloomy novel’s title aimed to provoke the readers’ tears. Unfortunately it’s a true story, a
tragic humanitarian story of the separation of two Saharawi sisters.This article will deal with their forceful separation, and all the moments that followed until their long awaited renuion, and finally their desperate hope for one permanent union.

Two walls divide Saharawi families in the occupied territories from those in the refugee camps. The first is the physical barrier the Moroccans have built, long berms of sand filled with land mines. The second, more excruciating wall is that of shame. Many people who live in the camps they have never met their family members on the other
side of the wall.

The two sisters’ separation started directly after the 1975 joint Moroccan-Mauritian invasion of Western Sahara. Fatama, the younger sister, fled Western Sahara to the barren Algerian desert. Her older sister Aichatu stayed in the occupied territories with their very old, frail father, half paralyzed from a hard life. 17 years old, Fatama was relived to reach the camps after a perilous journey. She had spent four days and four nights on foot laboring through the desert with
Moroccan fighters hovering in the sky above them, dropping bombs to demolish even the slightest blade of grass rustled by the wind. Any moving object was a target, so Fatama and the hundreds of other fleeing Saharawis traveled as secretly as possible.

Though safe from shells in the refugee camps, young and bright Fatama had to face the savage conditions of the scorched Sahara desert. The hammada showed no mercy to the young girl, and without her older sister, who had cared for her for the 10 years since their mother’s death, Fatama had to start over. With the help of some distant relatives, she managed to find a decent life in the camps, even getting married in her third year and bearing a son a year later.
Throughout the seventeen years of the war, neither of the sisters had any idea about the other’s destiny, or if she was even still alive. They had heard nothing of each other.

The Polisario Front and the Moroccan kingdom agreed to a ceasefire in 1991, brokered so that a referendum could take place on Western Sahara’s future. In preparation, Saharawi tribal leaders visited both sides of the berms to determine who is eligible to vote; a narrow ray of hope shone through the long winter of despair. Fatama would finally hear news of her sister and father. She was happy to learn of her family’s fate after sixteen years without learning anything, but
scared that the news would not be pleasant. She had never had the luxury of hearing about their day-to-day lives, so she wanted any news, good or bad.

As she expected, the news was bittersweet. Her sister was still alive and had five sons, but their father had died six years earlier. Her sister’s sons ask her about who he was, never able to meet their grandfather. Once or twice she told them who the man in the photo was, but it hurt to bad to explain why he was absent and why they had never
met him. Fatama fought the tears of hearing about her father’s death,  but in the end she lost. Sixteen years of grief and mourning engulfed her, and her simple hope to hug her father one last time was smothered forever. Before she heard the news, she had felt weak at times, and she had always re-energized herself with hope of seeing her father
again, but that source of strength was gone. In her hysteric sadness, she wondered why even the bad news had to be delayed so excruciatingly long.

In 2000, the first telephone landlines were installed in the camps. For the first time in 25 years, Fatama heard her sister’s
voice. They held a long and heartbreaking conversation, almost a full hour, but they wept together more than they talked. They wanted to talk every day, but of course, with lines of other equally anxious refugee families lining up to reforge long-lost connections with their occupied brothers and sisters, it was impossible for them to communicate very frequently. Normally selfless Fatama wished to be selfish and cut to the front of the long lines, and it was difficult for her to maintain patience for even one day in her life. Of course, only a moment peering at her companions’ worried faces made her feel
great shame from her impatience. 

In 2006, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) launched the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) program, which allowed the divided families to visit each other for five days. Immediately after hearing of the new program, Fatama registered her family on the list. That same day, she bought a new radio and began listening to

Saharawi national radio religiously, hoping to hear her and her sister’s names announced on air. For four years, she held her hope, and finally the UNCHR workers came to inform her that her sister would come on the next trip. It was the happiest news she had received in 21 years. However, three times the UNCHR workers came to her to with the
disappointing news of her sister’s delay. Fatama snapped, “No wonder you lie. You are part of the organization that told us to lay our weapons down, promising to organize a referendum and let us vote on our future. 15 years have passed and we are still waiting for you to do nothing!”

In 2010, her sister visit was finally confirmed. She was happy but of course skeptical about the UN’s word and habit of breaking promises. Even in her uncertain state, she started preparing for the most important event in her life. After 35 years of separation, she would finally meet her sister. Her frigid emotions moved, and scenes of their last time together flooded her mind. The next morning, with many family friends, Fatama stood, waiting for her sister’s arrival. Finally, the truck stooped to a halt. Fatama searched for her sister’s face for only a few seconds before she spotted her face. They held
each other and wept. Their embrace and was short-lived, disrupted by the crowd of her family, all there to welcome Aichatu.

The two sisters wished nothing but to have a family private reunion to huge each other again ,talk and enjoy being together after so many years of separation, but it was the costume to have the families friends and neighbors with you in the sad occasion as well as the happy ones, all that time Fatama kept staring and watching her sister in disbelief that they are in the same place but she have to wait for the visitors to be going so she can talk and fill their  hungry for seeing her sister.

Their five days together were busy, punctuated by dozens coming to say hello and ask about their family in the occupied territories. The only time that the two sisters had alone together was in late evening, after dinner and in the early morning. They tried to share everything that had occurred in each of their lives in the previous 35 years, since so much had changed in their lives. Fatama was now a mother of two girls and four boys. Two of the boys had finished their education,
the two girls were high school students, and one of her sons was a soldier. The youngest one was in fourth grade. They recalled most of the past too. They remembered their childhood and their many happy days with their father. After a while, they realized that though they  knew much of each others’ past and present, no mention of the future had been made.

The five days passed faster than light, the fastest in both of their lives. The temporary reunion was over and Aichatu had to depart. It was a sad moment for the two sisters and for everyone else there to say goodbye to Aichatu. Ali, Fatama’s son, was terribly sorry for his  mother. He had recognized the choked sorrow on his mother’s face for years and the joy her sister’s visit had brought. Ali’s friend was in disbelief to see his friend weeping has his aunt departed for the
occupied homeland. He asked if those five short days had been enough to make him cry like, a miracle in his mind. Ali cleared the grief from his throat and answered the provocative question.

“What makes me cry is my mother’s tears. I did not spend enough time with my aunt to be so attached to her. I was afraid to come to love her in these five days and then have to bear the agony of missing her forever, without the ability to see her again. This UN visit program is a bribe, a scheme to buy Saharawi patience. They think that
giving us the chance to see our families will cow us into bearing this miserable situation for years to come, no one knows how many.” 

This story is not unique. It is not even the worst in the camps. Fatama and Aichatu’s story is widely repeated in many Saharawi families. Likewise, Ali’s reaction is broadly shared by young people, a fact which should be easily understood, given that an entire generation comes to know their families through faded photos and crackling voices on the telephone. A few are lucky enough to meet their brothers, sisters, grandfathers, and grandmothers but never for
more than five days. This division of families is a huge source of anger in Saharawi youth, and it could be exploited to take up arms at anytime. This anger will only be defused when the Saharawi nation is offered the opportunity of self-determination and the ability to decide its destiny.
mohamedsalem210@gmail.com

Liberados en Mali los dos cooperantes españoles y la italiana secuestrados hace nueve meses

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Fotografía de archivo de 23/10/2011 de la española Ainhoa Fernández de Rincón.EFE/ARCHIVO

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RTVE.ES / AGENCIAS - BAMAKO 18.07.2012 - 17:15h

Los dos cooperantes españoles Ainhoa Fernández de Rincón y Enric Gonyalons y la italiana Rossella Urru, que fueron secuestrados en octubre en el campo de refugiados saharauis de Tinduf por el grupo terrorista Movimiento de Unicidad y Yihad en África del Oeste (MUYAO), han sido liberados en Mali, según ha confirmado a TVE el Ejecutivo español, que ha fletado un avión para repatriarlos.

Según las fuentes del Gobierno, que no han revelado detalles del lugar en el que los cooperantes han sido liberados, se ha enviado un helicóptero para trasladar a los tres a la zona a donde se ha desplazado el avión, una operación que se ha retrasado por una tormenta.

El portavoz del grupo radical islámico Ansar al Din, Sanda Uld, ha avanzado que los tres se encuentran ya en manos de mediadores de Burkina Faso.

En una primera valoración de esta operación, el Gobierno ha considerado que se trata de un éxito del servicio exterior del Estado y ha destacado la colaboración con los gobiernos de la zona.

Traslado de uno de los secuestradores preso

La agencia mauritana de noticias ANI había informado este miércoles de que el saharaui Mamine uld Evghir, preso en Nuakchot por su presunta implicación en el secuestro de los cooperantes y cuya liberación era una de las condiciones exigidas por el grupo para poner fin al mismo, había sido trasladado desde la cárcel a un lugar desconocido.

Un movimiento que la agencia interpretaba como el posible preludio del fin del cautiverio.

No obstante, el portavoz de la organización Ansar Al Din, quien ha informado en un primer momento de la liberación de Fernández, ha asegurado a Efe que no había habido condiciones.

El portavoz de Ansar al Din ha explilcado a Reuters que los tres secuestrados habían sido puestos en libertad en la región de Gao, situada a unos 1.200 kilómetros al noreste de la capital maliense, Bamako. También ha añadido que creía que los tres estaban en manos de mediadores de Burkina Faso.

Un portavoz de MUYAO, citado por la agencia francesa AFP, también ha confirmado la liberación de tres personas "en un país musulmán" y que sus "condiciones" se habían "cumplido", en alusión al pago de un posible rescate, aunque no ha querido especificar el importe. En mayo, MUYAO había exigido el pago de 30 millones de euros. 

Liberación de diplomáticos

La liberación se produce justo una semana después de que el mismo grupo, escindido de Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico, soltara a tres de los siete diplomáticos argelinos que mantenía también retenidos desde el 5 de abril.

Tanto el Gobierno español como el argelino y el italiano han llevado las negociaciones con MUYAO sobre la liberación de los rehenes con rigurosa discreción.

Tras la liberación de los tres diplomáticos de Argelia, el portavoz del ministerio de Exteriores argelino, Amar Belani, se limitó a confirmar a Efe su liberación y a asegurar que sus cuatro colegas permanecían retenidos en el norte de Mali.

Las gestiones para la liberación de los cooperantes españoles y la italiana se complicaron tras el golpe militar registrado en Mali a finales de marzo, cuando el ministro de Exteriores, José Manuel García-Margallo reconoció que se estaba "muy cerca" de lograr una solución al secuestro.

Según explicó el ministro, el intermediario con el que estaba trabajando el Gobierno español para liberar a Gonyalons y a Fernández "desapareció" después de que los militares sublevados se hicieran con el poder.

Exteriores continuó con las gestiones que estaba llevando a cabo y que implicaban tender puentes con el Movimiento Nacional para la Liberación de Azawad (MNLA), el grupo independentista tuareg que controla la mitad norte de Mali.

El pasado 6 de abril el MNLA proclamó la independencia del Estado de Azawad, que abarca una superficie de casi dos veces España.