Western Sahara: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012

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Permalink: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204390

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYShare    

Morocco claims the Western Sahara territory and administers Moroccan law through Moroccan institutions in the estimated 85 percent of the territory it controls. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), an organization that has sought independence for the former Spanish territory since 1973, disputes Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over the territory.

There has been no census since the Spanish left the territory, but the population was estimated to be more than 500,000, many of whom were attributable to Moroccan in-migration. The indigenous population is Sahrawi, (literally “people of the desert” in Arabic) who also live in southern Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

The Moroccan government sent troops and civilians into the northern two provinces after Spain withdrew in 1975 and extended its administration to the third province after Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 until a 1991 ceasefire and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping contingent, the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara, whose mandate does not include human rights monitoring. In the late 1980s, Morocco constructed an approximately 1,690-mile stone and sand wall known as the “berm” that effectively marks the limit of its administrative control.

In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario agreed to settle the sovereignty dispute by referendum. The parties did not resolve disagreements over voter eligibility and which options for self-determination (integration, independence, or something in between) should be on the ballot; consequently, a referendum has not taken place. Since 2007 there have been various attempts to broker a solution in face-to-face negotiations between representatives of the two sides under UN auspices, most recently facilitated by the UN secretary-general’s personal envoy for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross. Morocco has proposed autonomy for the territory within the kingdom; the Polisario has proposed a referendum in which full independence would be an option. During a ninth round of informal talks held March 11-13 in Manhassett, New York, each side maintained its position, as in previous rounds, unwilling to enter into negotiation.

Morocco considers the part of the territory that it administers to be an integral component of the kingdom with the same laws and structures conditioning the exercise of civil liberties and political and economic rights. Security forces reported to civilian authorities. Under the constitution ultimate authority rests with King Mohammed VI who presides over the Council of Ministers and approves members of the government recommended to him by the prime minister. In July 2011 Moroccans adopted a new constitution that was applied to the Western Sahara. (For additional information on developments in Morocco, see the 2012 Morocco Human Rights Report.) Nine parliamentarians were elected in November 2011 to represent the Western Sahara in the upper and lower houses of the Moroccan parliament.

The most important human rights problems specific to Western Sahara were Moroccan government restriction on proindependence views and associations; otherwise, overall human rights conditions in the territory converged with those in the kingdom. Several long-standing human rights problems related to proindependence activity, including limitations on the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, the use of arbitrary and prolonged detention to quell dissent, and physical and verbal abuse of detainees during arrests and imprisonment. Authorities also continued to deny formal registration to proindependence associations. As a result these associations were not able to establish offices, recruit members, collect donations, or visit imprisoned Saharan proindependence activists or Polisario separatists.

Widespread impunity existed, absent prosecutions of human rights abuses. Sahrawi human rights organizations claimed that the majority of police and other officials accused of torture remained in positions of authority. Widespread corruption continued among security forces and the judiciary.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:Share    

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

In contrast to the prior year, there were no reports that security officials committed unlawful killings, although the 2010 police killing of Said Dambar in Laayoune continued to reverberate in the Sahrawi community. In spite of repeated requests by Dambar’s family that his body undergo an autopsy, authorities on June 6 buried the body, providing the family with just 30 minutes advance notice. Local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alleged that during the years of Moroccan occupation between 53 and 71 Sahrawis were killed in detention from torture and that no investigations into these cases were ever opened.

b. Disappearance

There were no confirmed reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year; however, according to unconfirmed reports by local human rights organizations, Soua’dou El Garhi have allegedly disappeared in 2008 and Mohamed Lamin Boutaba’a in 2011.

The governmental National Council for Human Rights (CNDH) provided reparations, including monetary assistance, vocational training, and medical insurance to Sahrawis or family members of those who had disappeared or been detained during the 1970s and 1980s. During the year the Laayoune branch of CNDH recommended compensation of 141 taxi licenses, 108 homes or housing stipends, and 81 civil service jobs in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior to victims (or victims’ families) of forced disappearance. The CNDH continued to receive and investigate reparation claims throughout the year, although it shifted focus from individual reparations to community projects; however, none of CNDH-funded projects were located in the Western Sahara.

While the CNDH’s role is to investigate claims and forward and endorse recommendations on reparation settlements to the local government and relevant ministries, the actual delivery of reparations depends on government action. Of the 552 claims accepted during the year, the CNDH recommended reparations for 463. At year’s end 144 cases remained unresolved. Sahrawi human rights groups and families continued to claim that the CNDH had not accepted 114 cases for review; and that many more claimants had not actually received reparations.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Credible reports indicated that security forces engaged in torture, beatings, and other mistreatment of detainees. Both international and local NGOs continued to report abuses, especially of Sahrawi independence advocates. Torture typically occurred in pretrial detention, as exemplified in the September 17 joint submission of 10 Western Saharan human rights groups to Juan Mendez, the UN special rapporteur on torture. The document named 10 men still in detention arrested during the 2010 conflict at Gdeim Izik campsite who claimed to have been raped during their detention. Their families had filed accusations with the military court in Rabat, but there was no action on the claims by year’s end. Other types of abuse claimed to have been employed by security forces were: beating with electric cables, near suffocation with wet cloths soaked in urine or chemicals, cigarette burns, and hanging by the arms or as a “trussed chicken” for prolonged periods (see section 1.d.). According to local Sahrawi NGOs, since 2011 the courts no longer provided claimants of alleged police abuse with registration numbers to track the disposition of their claims.

Most incidents of degrading treatment occurred during proindependence demonstrations or protests calling for the release of Sahrawi political prisoners. On November 1, after she met with personal envoy of the UN secretary-general for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, at the UN mission in Laayoune, police attacked Aminatou Haidar, the head of the Sahrawi Collective of Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), and vandalized her car during a nonviolent protest. A video on YouTube shows Haidar shoved to the ground and threatened. At year’s end there were neither charges against those responsible, nor an investigation of the attack. The Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights and other human rights organizations condemned the attack. Other corroborated reports indicated that plainclothes police forcibly dispersed small protests several times a week.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

NGOs continued to allege abuse and a persistence of substandard prison conditions. According to the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons (OMP), an umbrella advocacy group of lawyers and activists promoting better conditions for prisoners, family members of inmates regularly complained of physical abuse and occasional torture of inmates in Laayoune Prison, the sole prison in Western Sahara. However, verification of these claims was impossible as the authorities prohibited human rights advocates and NGOs access to the prison since 2008. The most common allegations were physical abuse and a lack of access to health care. It was widely known that some prisoners and detainees were transferred to Sale, Marrakech, and other locations in internationally recognized Morocco, far from their families and lawyers. An October 30 CHDH report, which included Western Sahara, called for the Moroccan government to take steps to prevent torture in prisons.

Human rights and proindependence activists claimed authorities falsely charged them with criminal offenses. Laws require authorities to investigate abuse allegations for any individual facing prosecution who requests an investigation, but local and international human rights advocates claimed that courts often refused to order medical examinations or to consider medical examination results in cases of alleged torture. Most complaints were not investigated. Moreover, according to local NGOs, medical personnel failed to document any traces of injuries from torture, and ambulances were often not dispatched to treat the injured at demonstrations.

The 23 Sahrawis arrested during the 2010 dismantling of the Gdeim Izik camp and subsequent violence in Laayoune remained in custody during the year at Sale Number Two Prison near Rabat. One additional arrest was made on September 9 in Dakhla, and this detainee was added to the original 23 (see section 1.d.). On December 17, the prisoners were transferred from Sale Number Two to Sale Number One Prison. Their trial before a military tribunal was postponed twice and was rescheduled to begin on February 1, 2013. Families of the detainees charged that prison conditions were unusually harsh, with limited family visitation rights and little access to health care, proper food, and clean clothes.

Throughout the year there were continuing credible reports from Sahrawi activists who were detained and subsequently released--as well as many of the families of those still in custody--that security officials beat and otherwise abused them. However, according to several Sahrawi contacts police tended to use force against protesters in the streets without actually arresting them. Domestic NGOs alleged that in numerous instances security officials threatened detainees with rape. After his visit to Morocco and the Western Sahara, UN Special Rapporteur Mendez stated that he had good reason to believe there were credible allegations of sexual assault, threats of rape of the victim or family members, and other forms of ill-treatment.

NGOs providing social, educational, or religious services were permitted to enter detention facilities and visit with prisoners. NGOs with a human rights focus were not permitted to enter, except with special authorization. International delegations were occasionally allowed to visit but were usually restricted to common areas within the detention center with no access to prisoners in their cells. The OMP relayed complaints of substandard prison conditions to authorities, but authorities did not permit them to visit or investigate these complaints.

The government reported 34 total visits to the prison in Laayoune. The visits included one by a UN special rapporteur, 20 by judicial officials, five by governmental regional monitoring commissions, and eight by “national” NGOs. (The CNDH received complaints and made seven visits to Laayoune Prison, which the government likely counted as a “NGO visit” although the CNDH is a governmental organization.)

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but security forces routinely ignored this in practice.

At year’s end the 24 Sahrawis arrested during the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik camp in 2010 and subsequent violence in Laayoune remained in custody awaiting a trial date in February 2013 at Sale Prison near Rabat (see section 1.c.). By year’s end the government had issued no clear charges other than police allegations that they were connected to the deaths of 11 security service personnel during the riots.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

Police impunity remained a problem. The government reported no complaints registered against police or judicial police. However, during the year alleged victims of human rights abuses filed more complaints against police agents and Auxiliary Forces than in the previous year, according to several international, domestic, and Sahrawi NGOs. The government disputed the alleged increase and provided statistics indicating that through November, residents of Western Sahara had filed 113 complaints against authorities based throughout the territory. Judicial police and the prosecutor investigated the 113 complaints while dismissing 69 others on the grounds of lack of evidence. International and domestic human rights organizations claimed that authorities dismissed nearly all complaints and relied only on police version of events.

The government stated that it increased security personnel training in human rights and regularly coordinated with the CNDH to draw on the expertise of its members. On several occasions throughout the year, CNDH coordinated with international NGOs to hold conferences and training sessions on human rights protections mechanisms in the Western Sahara. Human rights components are included in basic training as well as in various educational milestones throughout the careers of most security personnel. According to the government, some prosecutions involved officers who allegedly committed crimes in the territory; however, the number was unavailable because data was not disaggregated by region. Human rights organizations continued to track the practice of allowing alleged abusers to remain in leadership positions or to be transferred to other positions. According to the unrecognized NGO Association of Sahrawi Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations (ASVDH) in their September 17 presentation to the UN special rapporteur on torture, 54 prison guards and officials had committed abuse amounting to torture (see section 1.c.).

While there was no large-scale societal violence as in the previous year in Dakhla, there was at least one case of societal violence in which Sahrawi travelers were attacked as they entered Morocco. Although Sahrawi activists alleged that security forces responded slowly and failed to protect the victims, the government maintained that authorities responded appropriately to prevent an escalation of violence between the Sahrawis and Moroccans.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

Police may arrest an individual after a general prosecutor issues an oral or written warrant; in practice warrants occasionally were issued after the arrest. Authorities denied defendants’ access to counsel or family members during the initial 96 hours of detention under terrorism-related laws or 48 hours of detention for other charges, during which police interrogated detainees and alleged abuse or torture was most likely to occur. In many cases, including those not related to terrorism, detainees were held incommunicado for several days and granted limited or no access to legal representation. Under the antiterrorism law, after the first 96 hours, two additional 96-hour extensions are allowed with the written approval of the prosecutor. By law a person may be detained without trial for as long as one year while an investigating magistrate completes work.

Arbitrary Arrest: NGOs claimed several cases of arbitrary arrest and detention occurred for periods up to 20 days, although arrests occurred less frequently than in previous years. According to several interlocutors in Laayoune, the decreased number of arrests at protest rallies was due to security forces’ opting for aggressive dispersal, rather than detention of participants in a gathering. This approach, according to NGO contacts, was used to instill fear without creating the paper record of an arrest. The 24 Sahrawis arrested during the 2010 dismantling of the Gdeim Izik camp and subsequent violence in Laayoune remained in custody during the year at Sale Prison near Rabat; a new trial date was set for February 1, 2013.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention was a problem throughout Morocco and Western Sahara, as evidenced by the 24 detainees in Sale Prison since 2010. Disaggregated information was not available.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

The government denied that there were political prisoners or detainees and claimed all those incarcerated had been convicted of or charged with crimes. However, human rights and proindependence groups alleged that there were up to 74 Saharawis held across Western Sahara and internationally recognized Morocco whom they considered political prisoners.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:Share    

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Moroccan law prohibits citizens from criticizing Islam or the institution of the monarchy or to oppose the government’s official position regarding territorial integrity and Western Sahara. Saharan media outlets and bloggers practiced self-censorship on these issues, and there were no reports of government action against them for what they had written.

The government enforced strict procedures governing the ability of NGOs and activists to meet with journalists. Foreign journalists needed and did not always receive prior official approval from the Ministry of Communication before meeting with leftist political activists. The Ministry of Communications accredited five American and one British journalists travelling on December 3 to 7 to Laayoune on a private visit. They were able to speak with proindependence activists, as well as local officials. However, according to a November 8 statement of the Interior Ministry, authorities expelled 15 Spanish and four Norwegian activist bloggers from the Western Sahara for entering without permission. According to the government, they travelled to Laayoune pretending to be tourists, but planned to meet proindependence activists at the time of the second anniversary of the clashes surrounding the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik campsite.

Internet Freedom

Moroccan and international media, including Polisario-controlled television and radio from the refugee camps in Algeria, as well as satellite television, were available in the territory. There was no indication that Internet access in the territory differed from that in internationally recognized Morocco, which was generally open. However, human rights and Sahrawi bloggers affiliated with leftist political groups assumed that authorities closely monitored their activities and felt the need to hide their identities.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Ministry of the Interior required those wishing to hold public gatherings, including demonstrations, to obtain permission for public assemblies and rarely granted permission for politically oriented events apart from those related to the election. The government generally used administrative delays and other methods to suppress or discourage demonstrations with political overtones and prohibited or failed to accept requests from groups in the territory associated with human rights activism or proindependence opinions. Authorities generally tolerated unauthorized sit-ins, demonstrations, and peaceful protests by groups such as the association of unemployed graduates that focused on economic grievances and did not bear on human rights or encourage a proindependence stance.

Several residents of Laayoune claimed that police tended to disperse large gatherings of all kinds, even dispersing reunions held to celebrate the return of family members from the Polisario camps at Tindouf. Following his visit to the region, UN Special Rapporteur Mendez stated that treatment “amounting to torture” appears in Morocco and the Western Sahara during “large demonstrations.” Reports also suggested that abuse may have occurred against smaller demonstrations as well. According to local NGOs, on October 1, seven were injured when police dispersed a sit-in by unemployed Sahrawi university graduates in the city of Essmara. Proindependence organizations and some human rights NGOs stated that in recent years they have applied less frequently for legal permits to engage in sit-ins and demonstrations because police rarely granted the permits. The government reported that by the end of the year, more than 700 demonstrations or protests had been held in Western Sahara. The majority of these related to socioeconomic issues such as unemployment and housing concerns, but a few also had political overtones, such as sit-ins by relatives of disappeared persons and alleged political prisoners.

Authorities violently dispersed protests throughout the year, resulting in dozens of injuries to heads and limbs that required medical attention. For example, on November 1, security forces using excessive force suppressed proindependence demonstrations in Laayoune, Dakhla, and Smara. On November 3, several protesters were arrested in follow-up demonstrations Dakhla. Victims of such abuse claimed that government authorities were slow to respond to the formal complaints they filed and contended that since 2011 they were unable to track the status of their complaints.

Freedom of Association

As in previous years, the government did not allow CODESA or the ASVDH to register as NGOs, limiting their ability to raise funds domestically and internationally and to facilitate public meetings. The CNDH invited the ASVDH to join its executive council, which consists in part of members of civil society. The latter refused on grounds that it would continue to seek formal recognition as a registered NGO before it would consider joining the council.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.

d. Freedom of Movement

Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the government restricted freedom to travel abroad. There were no reports of the government revoking citizenship. The government cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in implementing the UN’s Confidence Building Measures program which facilitated communication and family exchange visits between Sahrawis in Western Sahara and Sahrawi refugees in Algeria.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their GovernmentShare    

Moroccan citizens in the Western Sahara participated in local municipal and Moroccan parliamentary elections. Nine elected parliamentarians represent the Western Sahara in the House of Counselors (the upper chamber of the parliament). Most elected officials self-identify as Sahrawi and are native to Western Sahara.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in GovernmentShare    

Widespread corruption among security forces and judicial officials was a problem, as was lack of government transparency. Substantial development spending and military officers’ involvement in private business heightened both problems, particularly in the military as officers relied on government connections to gain preferential access to fishing licenses or lucrative contracts for sand and other quarries on state lands, for example. According to government officials, corruption problems, as with incidents of police brutality, were isolated and not endemic.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human RightsShare    

A small number of international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally were responsive to requests for meetings. The domestic NGOs investigating human rights cases were usually those not recognized by the government. Nevertheless, CNDH offices in Dakhla and Laayoune and other government officials maintained contact with and occasionally investigated some cases which these NGOs raised, especially those that drew international Internet or media attention.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in PersonsShare    

Information available on discrimination and other societal abuses in the territory is contained in the Human Rights Report on Morocco; the living conditions and social mores paralleled the situation in internationally recognized Morocco, and the laws are the same.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

Section 7. Worker RightsShare    

The Moroccan labor code applies in the Moroccan-controlled areas of the territory. Moroccan unions covering all sectors were present in those areas but were not active. The largest trade confederations maintained a nominal presence in Laayoune and Dakhla. These included the Moroccan Union of Labor, the Democratic Confederation of Labor, and the National Union of Moroccan Workers.

Strikes are legal, but there were no known labor strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining agreements during the year. Most union members were employees of the Moroccan government or state-owned organizations. Unions were also active in the phosphate and fishing industries. Wage-sector workers in the territory earned up to 85 percent more than their counterparts in internationally recognized Morocco as an inducement to relocate. The government exempted workers from income and value-added taxes and provided fuel subsidies.

The labor code prohibited forced or bonded labor, and there were no reports that such practices occurred. Penalties for those who perpetrate forced labor range up to four years’ imprisonment, and penalties for forced child labor are between one and three years in prison. Labor inspectors assigned to labor delegation offices in Laayoune and in Oued Eddahab enforced Moroccan labor laws.

Regulations on the minimum age of employment were the same as in Morocco. There were no reports regarding child labor in the formal wage sector. Children worked in family-owned businesses and in the agricultural sector.

The minimum wage and maximum hours of work and occupational health and safety standards were the same as in Morocco. In practice during peak periods, workers in fish processing plants worked as many as 12 hours per day, six days per week. Enforcement was rudimentary, except for prohibition on the employment of women in dangerous occupations.

Do you have any idea what is ‘homeland’ for a refugee? | Western Sahara Update

Asria Mohamed Taleb

2013-02-28, Issue 618

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/86416

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cc M GMany people may take for granted being the citizen of a free, sovereign nation. But for someone who was born in a refugee camp and has only heard about her occupied homeland, the question of citizenship stirs up very strong feelings.

Some people find it rude to be asked about their age, or how much they earn, while others find it offending to be asked about their religion. As a refugee, nothing makes me angrier, sadder and filled with hatred than someone asking me, ‘What is home for you?’ I find it to be a very mean question, the same as asking someone in a wheelchair, ‘Why can´t you walk?’. Due to the interaction with new people every day, I have had to face the challenge of answering this question ever since coming here, or at least provide a simple explanation to help others understand our complicated situation. Despite this, the difficulties I am dealing with are more about how to describe something I never had. I often get asked, ‘Are you from India?’ I must admit that I feel a special connection with this country although I wish that people would see Western Sahara in the features of my face instead of India. Almost every other person I have met whether in Algeria, Spain or here in Norway have asked me this question. I mention this example because I feel so jealous, and wonder how other countries have their own distinct characteristics and identity.

Meanwhile, the questions still playing back and forth in my mind are, ‘Why don’t people know about the characteristics of my people, the language we speak, what we believe in and where the Western Sahara is?’ However, I believe that what makes me more angry is knowing that these thoughts are stupid because how could people know the answers to all these questions, if I am unable to answer them myself? It does make me sad and angry every time people do not understand where I live or where I originally come from. I want to try answer this for those who wonder what home is for us and specifically for myself as a refugee. ‘Sahara zaina’, (Sahara the beautiful) my grandmother, once said while we were sat having tea listening to our national radio. ‘Soon you will experience that’, my grandmother added. She died years ago, and I grew up and worked in that same radio station while other grandmothers were probably telling the same things to their grandchildren.
I hope we will not stay until I become a grandmother telling the same stories to my children. The difference between my grandmother and I is that she knew what our homeland looked like and I do not because I have only seen these refugee camps. I was born in these camps, I lived here my whole life and in a way, it is home for me because it is the only home that I know!! I went to school in Algeria, a wonderful country which provided us some land to make a home out of after Morocco raped our homeland. As young refugees, we suffered from many things. This makes me laugh now and cry at the same time. When we were young, it did affect us when others made fun of us that we did not have a country and that we had come from refugee camps living in tents. Some of us started to lie, that we lived in the liberated area of Western Sahara, where there were a few houses and life could be yours. In my third year in university, we studied Algerian history. I had the best grades and sometimes I wish I did not. One of my classmates found it unfair and said to the teacher, ‘Should she not know the history of her country first?’.

 I could not argue because my tears always failed me. Everyone felt sorry for me. I too felt sorry and angry because of our situation. That face of sympathy my classmates gave me is the same face that people give me when I say that I am a refugee. That is the face I hate the most. It makes me feel like I do not belong anywhere. However, inside me, I know Western Sahara is my home. I have never seen it but I know it does exist, may be it does not exist in other peoples minds or library books and school maps, but it does exist inside me, inside all the Saharawi and inside all those who believe in justice.
Home for me is where I belong, home is a place that will open its arms to me, no matter how good or bad I am. Home is stabilization, security and identity. Home for many people is something tangible; home for us is a dream. Home for you is a reality; home for me is a wish. Home for you is existence; home for me is a struggle. You live in your home; my home lives inside me. ‘Where do you want to spend your life, Asria?’, my friend asked this question when we were traveling. Before I answered him, I had to explain that I do not really agree that we should have borders; I wish that all people could be able to live together.

But first I want to experience that feeling. The feeling of belonging. The feeling that people get when they see me wearing my traditional Melhfa and say to me that I am from Western Sahara not India. I want to witness my family and all Saharawi return to our country; I want to know that all Saharawi in the occupied area live in security. I want to make sure that our next generation will live in peace and stability. I might move to a place where I feel is me, maybe Western Sahara or any other place in the world, because what is important is to live amongst people who you love, and the people who I love live in the refugee camps for that is our home until we get our independence.

 * Asria Mohamed Taleb is a young Saharawi woman living in Norway. She has written a book 'A Norwegian Hope Journey: Between the strong sand and the white snow lives my hope for a free Sahara’ EXTRA LINKS Michael Palin’s visit Part One:

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A Pep Talk from Kid President to You

Responses to Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains | Middle East Institute

Image from the CIA World Factbook

Responses to: Solving the Western Sahara — What Now Remains

I applaud Mr. Gabriel’s desire to reach a solution to the conflict over Western Sahara, which is urgently necessary to stop the suffering of the Saharawi people, who are either treated as second-class citizens without freedom of speech and freedom of movement in an occupied territory, or living impoverished lives in refugee camps far away from their homeland. I also agree that a definite resolution of the conflict will remove one of the greatest obstacles to promoting greater stability, economic prosperity and cooperation in the Maghreb region, and that because of this the United States should play a more active role.

Where I disagree is with Mr. Gabriel’s attempt to portray the Polisario as the obstacle to peace.  Whether or not Morocco would ever be forced to give up its illegal occupation of Western Sahara is a matter of conjecture. What is certain is that no country in the world recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Not the United States, and not France, supposedly Morocco’s biggest ally. In fact, the African Union has even granted full membership to the government in exile of Western Sahara, thereby recognizing Western Sahara as an independent African state.

It is also completely disingenuous to present Morocco’s proposal for limited autonomy as a magnanimous compromise, when it is no such thing. Far from compromising, Morocco persists in pursuing its original aim ― the complete annexation of Western Sahara. If Morocco’s proposal was such a compromise, the UN Security Council would surely have endorsed it unreservedly and called on the parties to implement it. But the Council did not, because Morocco’s proposal is completely inconsistent with the “basic criteria for self-determination” that even Mr. Gabriel acknowledges must be taken into account. Having people participate in a “referendum” where they are asked simply to confirm their approval of a single choice is akin to holding an election in North Korea and calling it genuine. I note in passing that it is ironic that Mr. Gabriel, who as a former US Ambassador must surely have been instructed to extol the virtues of freedom and democracy, should now expend so much energy opposing a free and fair vote in Western Sahara. Those who are most afraid of allowing free votes are those who don’t want to accept the outcome they know will emerge, and it is they who are usually the biggest enemies of peace and democracy. The organization of a free vote in which the Sahrawi people are given a genuine choice is not a “winner take all” solution ― just the opposite. 

Let us remember that Western Sahara was designated by the United Nations in 1963 as a Non Self Governing Territory which under international law is required to undergo a process of de-colonization. Morocco subverted that process for its own aims, and we are still living with the consequences of that today. But the Saharawi population’s right to self-determination is undiminished. This is not my judgment ― the right to self-determination lies at the core of international human rights law, so fundamental in fact that it is referenced in article 1 of the human rights covenants. Mr. Gabriel’s casual attempt to denigrate the importance of this right by placing it in quotation marks does not change its inalienability. The pursuit of self-determination is what led many nations in the world to their independence, including the United States. It is this key principle that still informs the mandate of the UN Mission in Western Sahara, which is given renewed legitimacy by the Security Council every year. One of the primary functions of the UN Mission is to organize the conduct of a referendum of the Saharawi people to enable them to freely choose their own future. Despite its presence in Western Sahara for over twenty years this has still not happened.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Gabriel chooses to ignore these facts and instead presents the current Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara as an “absolute reality.” It would be helpful to remember that the International Court of Justice ruling in 1975 clearly established that Morocco had no ties of territorial sovereignty to Western Sahara. Attempts to ignore this and instead support measures to formalize an unlawful Moroccan occupation would not only constitute a deeply damaging and destabilizing precedent in international law, but also have knock-on effects in other conflict situations. Basing a solution entirely on so-called “political reality” or facts on the ground, without reference to accepted international law is not only deeply cynical, but also completely impractical. One only has to look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to see this.

Instead, sincere and renewed efforts must be made to reach a solution that is compatible with the fundamental precepts of international law and the previous agreements between the parties, not least the 1991 Settlement Plan agreed between Morocco and Polisario. The only fair middle-ground to this conflict is therefore to organize a free vote of the Saharawi people, which includes as options the Moroccan proposal for limited autonomy as well as the possibility of establishing a free and independent state of West Sahara. Such an approach would recognize the Moroccan initiative as a possible solution to the conflict, while not ruling out the existence of other proposals, which could more accurately reflect the wishes of the people who lie at the heart of this dispute. Moroccan intransigence should not be allowed to obstruct the peace process and prevent the Saharawi people from exercising their fundamental right to self-determination.

-Carne Ross

Ambassador Gabriel’s discussion of the about the impasse on the Western Sahara question within the Security Council that has prevailed almost since the origin contribution is both candid and realistic. For almost 40 years, a number of UN secretary generals, personal envoys, special representatives, and under-secretary generals from the department of peace-keeping operations or political affairs, have been in charge of this dossier, but have been unable to break the deadlock. The impasse has had regrettable consequences for the people, who remain in refugee camps. It has also had a negative impact on the development of the Maghreb region as well as on the long-term stability of the countries concerned.

Even if I believe Carne Ross to be motivated not only by his links with the Polisario Front but also by his genuine ethical approach of diplomacy, I concur with Ambassador Gabriel that any solution which reverts to inapplicable documents or failed recipes would impede progress. There are those who benefit from the status quo — whose power and advantages are preserved by the lack of an electoral process or democratic accountability. In this context, the then immovable Minister of Interior of Morocco, Driss Basri, knew that the status quo was an effective way to maintain his grip and influence in the country.

Martin Indyk, former US Assistant Secretary of State, in an interview with the Moroccan weekly Le Journal Hebdomadaire acknowledged, in September 2009, that King Hassan II was convinced of the necessity of embracing the notion of autonomy for Western Sahara. As I wrote in my May 21 essay, I personally came to this same conclusion, though I know that there were strong opponents to such a move in both camps. It seems to me that US Secretary of State James Baker shared this feeling in 2000 adding nevertheless that some form of referendum should conclude the process leading to autonomy so as to preserve a link with the original plan.

Members of the UN Security Council, while playing their traditional part in what looks like a theatrical performance, never showed any appetite for change or readiness to turn the table back in order to impose a deadline as well as conditions for a self-determination referendum. Carne Ross appears to be helpless as it is a stillborn proposal due to the fierce opposition of France and the United States to any approach that could potentially undermine the stability of Morocco or risk compromising their relations with Algeria. Furthermore, with the passivity of the large majority of the Security Council, no other country is ready to counter this policy as almost all of them, openly or secretly, have for long shared this prudent policy. The most evident demonstration is that nothing has happened since I left the UN Headquarters on September 30, 2000.

Would it be wise to re-ignite a debate on this question after 35 years of procrastination in the Security Council? Would it make sense to provoke tensions within the African Union or even risk further instability in the sub-Saharan and Sahel region, which has seen Islamist extremists seize control of northern Mali?

Is it constructive to refuse any other avenue than the only one that has irremediably demonstrated its inanity since the origin? Is it opportune to reject any discussion or dialog, while seeing despair in the Sahrawi refugee camps and knowing that it would last for years or decades to come? These are the real questions to consider and issues to solve.

Ambassador Gabriel’s suggestion to press the US Government to discuss afresh this matter with Algeria and Morocco is useful in light of the risks of destabilizing the sub-region. As the new French administration is also willing to have a balanced and positive relationship with both Rabat and Algiers, Paris and Washington could combine efforts to impress on Algeria ― whose influence remains critical in this process ― the need to move forward on the Western Sahara issue as well as to convince Rabat of the merits of a genuine dialog on the relevance and content of autonomy.

-Bernard Miyet