Morocco's Short-Sighted Politics | FPIF | Western Sahara Update

'By Anna Theofilopoulou, May 21, 2012

Protesters in Morocco

April of this year marked the 21^stanniversary since the UN Security Council accepted responsibility for trying to resolve the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. The referendum has never taken place, nor is it likely to ever happen. Nor, for that matter, is it likely that the conflict will be resolved through the mutually acceptable political solution that the Council has been asking for since April 2004.

The Security Council adopted yet another resolution asking the parties, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, which represents Western Saharans, to demonstrate the political will to work on the implementation of its resolutions, something that they have not done so far and giving them another year to continue with their posturing. And again, the Council failed to squarely address the question of human rights in the territory, other than to include a weak passage in the resolution’s introduction stressing the “importance” of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and surrounding refugee camps, and welcoming unilateral steps by Morocco to fulfill its commitments on the issue.

So far, neither party to the dispute appears willing to take the meaningful steps necessary to resolve a conflict that started in 1975 when Morocco annexed Western Sahara, stating that it was reclaiming its “southern provinces” colonized by Spain. However, although both sides have blocked solutions that did not meet their expectations, Morocco has been the more obstructionist party, unwilling to discuss any solution that does not recognize a priori its “sovereignty” over Western Sahara.

In its usual manner of upping the ante, Morocco now demands the removal of Christopher Ross, Ban Ki-moon’s personal envoy for Western Sahara, on grounds that he attempted to introduce subjects outside his competence. In making this demand, Morocco is following a long history by both sides of demanding the removal of special representatives or personal envoys the moment they perceived actions, real or imagined, considered detrimental to their interests.

For years, the UN has pretended that somehow it can resolve the standoff without pushing either side to make real compromises. The UN has been lulled into believing that there can be a mutually acceptable solution without putting the parties on notice to demonstrate that they want one.

Morocco’s management of its internal demands for change in 2011 was similar to the short-sighted manner in which the country has handled the Western Sahara conflict. A side-by-side analysis of the two trajectories reveals that Morocco’s democratic deficit and limited strategy, too often abetted by allies, have contributed to an unsustainable status quo both at home and in Western Sahara. For anything to change, Morocco’s allies—especially the United States and France—must start demanding better.

Change in Morocco

February 20, 2011 saw the first demonstration in Morocco when the unemployed and under-privileged demanded constitutional monarchy,government attention to poverty and unemployment, restoration of dignity, and an end to graft and corruption. The ensuing movement took its name from that date.

Having witnessed events in neighboring states, King Mohammed VI addressed the country on March 9, 2011 and promised comprehensive constitutional change, including the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and an elected government that reflected the will of the people. He then appointed a commission of experts headed by Abdeltif Menouni, a constitutional law professor known for his pro-monarchy views, to quickly draft a new constitution.

The king presented the constitution to the nation in a televised speech on June 16. Two weeks later, on July 1, a referendum on the constitution was held.

The king encouraged the public to support the new constitution by quoting a passage from the Qur’an. The Ministry of Religious Affairs apparently instructed imams to urge a “yes” vote during Friday sermons. The mainstream political parties accepted the process and hurried to campaign for a “yes” vote in the referendum — including the opposition Justice and Development Party (PJD), which claimed that the new constitution contained sufficient guarantees for democracy. The February 20 Movement rallied thousands across the country to boycott the constitution but were countered by violent supporters of the referendum who called the protesters anti-monarchists, raising suspicions that the Interior Ministry had organized the monarchists.

There were reports of voters being bussed to voting stations by state officials, stations not carrying “no” ballots, and officials failing to verify voters’ identifications. Videos posted online showed officials rummaging through openballot boxes. The Ministry of the Interior had calculated the proportion of registered voters at no more than 50 or 60 percent of the population, so the reported turnout of 72.65 percent — which in turn approved the constitution by 98.5 percent — raised some eyebrows. 

In its first article, which defines the foundations of Morocco’s regime, the new constitution addresses all key demands of the protesters — namely, parliamentary monarchy, separation of powers, and accountability for those in charge. However, the actual changes are less than what meets the eye. A close and careful reading of the document shows that Morocco has a long way to go toward becoming a real parliamentary monarchy. 

Forty-five percent of registered voters voted in the November 2011 legislative elections, compared to the 37 percent that had voted in the 2007 elections. Considering the changes that these elections entailed under the new constitution, this number was quite low. As John Entelis points out in his December 2011analysis discussing the constitutional changes, the number pointed to cynicism, indifference, and apathy among Moroccans who believed that it would not really matter whether they voted, despite the professed changes in the new constitution.

The subsequent machinations by the political parties and the palace to form the new government seemed to justify this indifference. The PJD won 107 of the 395 seats in the parliament, or 27 percent of the vote, and still needed support from other parties to form a government. Eighteen out of the 35 political parties that won much smaller numbers of seats tried to offset this by forming their own coalition blocs.

Following the elections, Abdelilah Benkirane, the head of PJD, went on to form his government by approaching the most likely allies. After negotiations by the parties to get the ministries that they considered important in exchange for cooperating with PJD and acquiescing to the nominations of royally chosen ministers, the new government was finally formed

On December 7, Benkirane found out that the king had appointed his friend Fouad El Himma, the head of the Party of Modernity and Authenticity (PAM), as one of his royal advisers, as well as Taieb Fassi Fihri, the former foreign minister. Although Benkirane had excluded PAM from the government prior to the start of the talks, he accepted the appointment of the royal advisors even though this compromised his desire for direct contact with the king.

The strong hand of the palace in shaping the new government was no different from years past. Aware that his options were limited, Benkirane tried to make the best of it and demonstrated his political flexibility in the negotiations.

Morocco’s Handling of the Western Sahara Conflict

The conflict over Western Sahara is again at an impasse. Although both parties are responsible for this, Morocco started it by rejecting in 2004 the UN Peace Plan approved by the Security Council. The Council merely stood by, timidly asking for new negotiations between the parties.

After annexing Western Sahara in November 1975, Morocco proceeded to put “facts on the ground” to ensure its victory in an eventual referendum. Around half of the territory’s native Saharan population stayed while the other half fled to southern Algeria, where the Algerian government settled them in refugee camps. Morocco then proceeded to relocate thousands of Moroccans into the territory, claiming that it was facilitating the return of Saharans who had fled to Morocco when Western Sahara was a Spanish colony.

In August 1988, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar persuaded Morocco’s King Hassan II to accept the UN’s broad guidelines for an internationally supervised ceasefire and a democratic referendum offering the people of Western Sahara the choice of independence or integration with Morocco. The king accepted the proposals in principle, but his subsequent statements left no doubt that he saw the coming referendum as a “confirmative” one for Morocco.

The UN created the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to organize the referendum. Due to logistical considerations, it was agreed that the two parties would submit names of applicants to the MINURSO Identification Commission, which was tasked with identifying potential voters to be interviewed to ascertain their eligibility to vote.

Morocco’s strategy for winning was two-pronged. Locally, it overwhelmed the Identification Commission with applicants and pushed to have as many as possible approved. Morocco submitted a total of 180,000 (100,000 of them living in Morocco), while Polisario submitted only 39,000. Morocco also proceeded to inject resources into the territory, building up its cities, developing its infrastructure, and providing financial and other incentives to thousands of Moroccans to move there. It tried to divide the Saharans by co-opting certain tribes and giving them privileged positions, while remaining indifferent to the fate of the majority and repressing those who challenged Morocco’s presence. It thus created a local constituency of Saharans that expected to benefit in the final settlement, making Morocco’s task of compromise with Polisario all the more difficult.

Internationally, Morocco used its allies inside the UN Security Council, foremost among them France, but also the United States, to obtain decisions beneficial to its position. Morocco also leveraged its influence with members of the UN Secretariat, where both members of the Council and the Secretariat tried at times to accommodate Morocco and facilitate its chances to win the referendum.

Ultimately the Identification Committee deadlocked as both parties continued to insist on the referendum yet challenged the process at every step. This resulted in former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III being brought in to break the impasse. When finally the new king, Mohammed VI, realized that following his father’s strategy would not help him resolve the issue and tried to negotiate a political solution, it was too little, too late. In September 2000, Morocco agreed to discuss an autonomy solution for Western Sahara “taking into account Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Predictably, Polisario rejected the offer and insisted on the referendum under the settlement plan.

In 2003, at the request of the Security Council, Baker put forward  the Peace Plan for Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara. The plan envisaged a final referendum of self-determination, with choices of integration, independence, or continuing autonomy after a four-year period of autonomy, during which both sides would be involved in the governing of the territory. The Council approved the plan and called upon the parties to work with the UN and each other toward implementing it. Polisario accepted the plan but Morocco rejected it in April 2004, leading the Security Council (led by France, the United States, and rotating member Spain) to urge the parties to devise their own mutually agreed political solution, ignoring the fact that two years earlier Baker had informed the Council that the parties would not agree to such a solution.

Several resolutions by the Security Council that read like wish lists followed, encouraging Morocco to come up with its own autonomy proposal as it had promised to do when it rejected the 2003 peace plan. Finally, in April 2007, Morocco presented to the UN a proposal that placed Western Sahara within the framework of the “Kingdom’s sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity.” Although the Security Council was not quite prepared to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, it characterized the Moroccan proposal as “serious and credible” in its resolution, despite strong private misgivings about it among France, Germany, the United States, and the UK, as later revealed by Wikileaks.

The resolution called for negotiations without preconditions, with a view toward achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. That set the stage for a slew of meetings where the parties have met, exchanged views, and politely agreed to meet again. That resolution and subsequent ones have set the path forstalemate.

Morocco continues with its strategy of short-sighted inflexibility. It has expanded its lobbying efforts within the U.S. Congress and news outlets in the United States, where individuals without a real grasp of the conflict present simplistic views on how the conflict could be resolved by adopting the Moroccan proposal. Outright support from France and subtle support from the United States is assured no matter what.

Polisario, which presented its own proposal to the UN based on the UN peace plan, continues in its wishful thinking. It equates rhetorical support from states like Algeria and international civil society with meaningful action to help resolve the conflict. 

What Needs To Be done

In Morocco and in Western Sahara, dangerous inertia reigns.

Morocco’s powerful friends must insist that it adopt the necessary legislation and start bringing about the changes promised by its new constitution. Past performance by previous parliaments suggests that that it is not a foregone conclusion that the current one will make good use of the new constitution’s potential to bring about real change on its own.

Demonstrations and violence since the elections illustrate the continuing disappointment and despair among the young and disaffected. Yet Moroccan authorities continue to ignore the signs of discontent and growing unrest, both domestically and in Western Sahara. Having weathered the crisis by drafting a new constitution and holding “different” elections praised by its allies, Morocco has developed a false sense of security. The frustration within Morocco and a recent spate of disturbances in Western Sahara speak to the frustration of young Saharans and Moroccans with economic and social conditions.

Those with real power in Morocco who are still resisting the idea of real reform need to change course to address the population’s grievances. They need to be disabused of the belief that cosmetic changes and repression will bring the desired results, because time is running out.

Morocco should stop claiming that it will provide autonomy to Western Sahara within its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. This language may be acceptable domestically, but it ruins internationally any chance of resolving the conflict. Even the best and highest paid lobbyists in the world cannot persuade the U.S. and French governments to violate international norms and recognize such non-existent sovereignty.

Morocco proposes to govern the autonomous territory in a truly democratic manner, while refusing, with France’s unfailing support, to even consider accepting a UN-administered human rights mechanism to monitor the situation within the territory. Both claim correctly that such a task is not included in MINURSO’s mandate. When MINURSO was set up in 1991, this task could not have been foreseen since it was assumed that the referendum would be held within a year. However, MINURSO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have been carrying out confidence-building measures outside their mandates, which Morocco resisted at first. There is no reason, other than Morocco’s refusal to agree, why human rights monitoring by the UN cannot be undertaken on both sides.

By ignoring the link between autonomy arrangements and democracies, the Moroccan authorities disregard the fact that an authoritarian regime like their own cannot be trusted to practice true democracy in Western Sahara. True autonomy can only exist within a democratic system. Morocco should be advised and encouraged by its powerful friends to start implementing real democracy internally and in Western Sahara. More flexibility and less disdain and sense of entitlement in its dealings with Polisario and Saharans could achieve more progress.  

There are plenty of constitutional arrangements within democratic states that could be adapted to the Western Sahara situation. Rather than continuing with the current norm, the Security Council must press Morocco and Polisario to examine carefully their respective proposals, find points of convergence (there are several), and work out their differences in a way that an implementable arrangement emerges.

The latest crisis created by Morocco’s demanding the removal of current Personal Envoy Christopher Ross fits a pattern of such behavior by both sides. When Baker resigned because he could not do anything more to help the parties, the Moroccan foreign minister called it “a triumph of Moroccan diplomacy.” Polisario and Algeria demanded that then-Special Representative de Soto stop dealing with the political solution on grounds that his previous association with Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar made him suspect of sympathy to Morocco. Similarly, they demanded the removal of Personal Envoy van Walsum because of bias in favor of Morocco. 

A mediator who loses the confidence of one or both sides to a dispute is no longer effective and should resign or be removed. When Baker resigned, the secretary-general should have told the Security Council and the parties that another mediator would be appointed only after all concerned showed willingness to negotiate and make hard decisions. Instead, he reassured them that he would continue helping them, a pattern continued by Ban Ki-moon, without recognizing that appointing special envoys without conditions only supports the parties in their inflexibility.

The continuation ad infinitum of the current situation, which only seems to encourage violence in Morocco and Western Sahara, should be unacceptable for all concerned with stability and prosperity in North Africa. It is incumbent on Morocco’s allies, mainly the United States and France, to stop blindly supporting its every position in the mistaken belief that they are helping. Real help for Morocco should include demanding more, both in terms of its internal politics and its handling of the Western Sahara conflict.

Norway fends off AGF from Western Sahara | Western Sahara Update

Norway fends off AGF from Western Sahara

Some producers supply tomatoes, zucchini and melons to French supermarkets, which get sold with the origin as Morocco. But in fact these products from the Western Sahara.

Producers of these fruits and vegetables have large acreage in Dakhla in the Western Sahara, which is colonial territory. Under international law, products that are produced in a colony may only be sold if it is with the consent of the local population and where they benefit from it. In Dakhla, the tomatoes, zucchini and melons are grown, however, without the consent of the Sahrawis and they benefit in no way says APSO, a French organization that defends the local population in the Western Sahara.

Since December 2011, they have asked all the French supermarkets about selling fruits and vegetables which come from the Western Sahara as well as their actions: by selling these products because they support colonization. Until now, Carrefour is the only one who has confirmed its neutrality. APSO hoped that this chain would remove the products from its stores sent for, but this has not happened.

APSO hopes that the fruit and vegetables from the Western Sahara which also sold for much less than products that are grown in France itself, is prohibited. This is already the case in Norway.

Latin American Herald Tribune - Bardem’s Documentary Wins Prize (VIDEO) | Western Sahara Update

Bardem’s Documentary Wins Prize (VIDEO) By Virginia HebreroSAHARAWI REFUGEE CAMP IN DAKHLA, Algeria – The documentary “Hijos de las nubes, la ultima colonia” (Sons of the Clouds, the Last Colony) produced by and starring Javier Bardem, is the winner of the White Camel award, the top honor handed out at the Sahara Film Festival, or FiSahara, that took place this weekend at this refugee camp. Directed by Alvaro Longoria, the film analyzing the political and strategic interests that are hampering the resolution of the Saharawi conflict was screened in Dakhla before it is due to hit Spanish theaters in a few weeks but after being presented at the Berlin Film Festival. In the documentary, Bardem leads the viewer through the roots of the conflict up to the current situation of stagnation and obscurity of the Saharawi people. Neither Bardem nor Longoria traveled to Dakhla, but the prize – which was awarded on Saturday by a popular panel at the non-competitive festival, the only one in the world held in a refugee camp – was to be accepted by sound technician Charlie Schmukler from the hands of actress Aitana Sanchez Gijon. The festival’s co-director, actor Willy Toledo, told Efe that it was “predictable” that “Hijos de las nubes” would take the top award because “always when there is a great film that deals with the Saharawi conflict, like ‘El problema’ two years ago, it is greatly appreciated here.” Bardem’s documentary “has a focus on high politics, the corridors of the U.N., world leaders, that had not been seen in other films with a Saharawi theme, and beyond that it’s very educational for whose who aren’t familiar with the conflict,” Toledo said. Breaking the tradition of offering a real camel to the Saharawi family who hosted Bardem at the camp during the 2008 FiSahara festival, when the idea for the documentary was born, the organizers decided to donate it to the Saharawi police force that currently guarantees the safety of the public and of the event’s invited guests. That was to avoid a recurrence of something like the dramatic kidnapping more than six months ago at the Saharawi camps of three aid workers – Spaniards Ainhoa Fernandez and Enric Gonyalons, and Italian Rosella Urru – to whom the festival paid tribute. Two special mentions will be made at the festival, one of them regarding the documentary “Gdeim Izik: detonante de la primavera arabe,” which tells about the creation and displacement, in November 2010, of the Saharawi camp in the area occupied by Morocco established at El Aaiun, a protest that some analysts felt was the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring throughout the Middle East and North Africa. EFE

Participación de la UJSARIO en el congreso de la CJC (Juventud Comunista de Cataluña) | Western Sahara Update

*Fuente: UJSARIO

La UJSARIO fue invitada a participar en el 10 º Congreso de los Colectivos de Jóvenes Comunistas, la Juventud Comunista de Cataluña (CJC-CAT), que tuvo lugar del 4 al 6 de mayo de 2012, en Barcelona. El Congreso tuvo lugar bajo el lema "El capitalismo no tiene futuro. Nosotros sí". Los principales puntos que se trataron en este congreso fueron los problemas que enfrentan los jóvenes de Cataluña, como el costo de la educación superior, la pérdida de derecho civil, el alto costo de vida, el incremento de la precariedad laboral especialmente para los jóvenes, etc frente a estos problemas la nueva línea política (que incluye problemas y cómo superarla) fue escrito por todos los miembros de CJC-CAT y se vio reflejado en los documentos que se presentó en el Congreso y también fueron elegidos los nuevos miembros para dirigir los cargos del CJC- CAT durante los próximos 4 años.

El representante de la UJSARIO Tecber Ahmed Al-Saleh Gaid tuvo la oportunidad de reunirse y discutir sobre la lucha saharaui con el secretario general de la CJC-CAT y las delegaciones internacionales en busca de una posible cooperación futura y la solidaridad con UJSARIO. Las delegaciones internacionales fueron de: Ung Vanster-Suecia, la Juventud Comunista de Austria (KJÖ) - Austria, Federazione Giovanile Comunisti Italiani (FGCI) - Italia, la FMJD Federación Mundial de la Juventud Democrática, Chipre, Mouvement des Jeunes Communistes de France (MJCF 31) - Francia y la Unión de Juventudes Comunistas de España (UJCE).

Western Saharan activist: ‘We will be free, but we need help’ | Green Left Weekly | Western Sahara Update

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

Western Saharan human rights activist Malak Amidane (with sign) at Adelaide's May Day rally, May 6. Photo: Ryan Mallett-Outtrim

Western Saharan human rights campaigner Malak Amidane is touring Australia in May to raise awareness of the brutal occupation of her homeland.

Amidane and her family live in Laayoune, the capital of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. In recent years, Moroccan security forces have targeted the Amidane family for speaking out against the illegal military occupation. Amidane herself has been beaten, imprisoned and tortured by Moroccan police. Since 2006 she has campaigned for greater international support for Western Sahara in Spain and France.

Green left Weekly’s Ryan Mallett-Outtrim spoke to Amidane about the ongoing crisis in Western Sahara.

* * *

Can you tell me what it’s like for Sahrawi living under the occupation?

All the Sahrawi people suffer. But, for my family, many are in prison and many are in the refugee camps.

I have a brother who was imprisoned two times. The first time was for two years, the second for five. He went to the jail at 18 and was released when he was 25 years old. It’s so hard, because he lost his [ability to] study and now he has health problems.

My sister too: she’s a human rights defender but she can’t go back home. My mum is alone now. There is a police car outside the house 24 hours a day. It’s a horrible situation.

You have an injury to your eye. It is being treated in Spain because you cannot have the surgery in Western Sahara, right?

Yeah, it’s an old injury from 2006. I was beaten in a demonstration. It was very bloody. I couldn’t go to the hospital because the police were there.

During demonstrations, if anyone goes to the hospital the police are there and they take them directly to the police station. We were scared, so we just put natural remedies on [the injury]. But, that has [caused] problems with my [eye]. I couldn’t see so well, so I go to Spain to have surgery and now next month I have [more] surgery too.

How many times have you been beaten by police?

I [don’t] know, too many times. My family house was also set on fire. Moroccan citizens came with the police and they were looking for me. They were looking for my papers, so they set fire to everything. My family escaped and stayed with friends. You know, I am so lucky to be here — to be able to talk when many cannot.

You have been in Australia for about a week now. Could you compare the support movement for Western Sahara here to Spain and France?

In France it’s zero ... there is nothing. In Spain, the government is bad ... they promise us many things but don’t do anything. But the Spanish people are helping. They are trying to do what the government cannot. They go to the camps, they send humanitarian aid and they bring children from the camps for holidays. They go to the occupied territories to see what has happened to us.

As for the Australian people, there are few people that know about the case [of Western Sahara], but they are working hard to open the eyes of other Australians.

Why is it important that Australians care about Western Sahara?

Australia is a country that steals a lot of Western Sahara’s phosphate. We suffer a lot in my country because of this. We are so poor, we have nothing.

When I came to Australia, I came to speak to the Australian people, to pressure the Australian government to stop these companies that steal our natural resources. We need your support to be free.

What is the hardest thing about getting support here in Australia?

I think the Australian people are a good people, but they don’t know anything about many countries like Western Sahara.

Do you hope that more Sahrawi will visit Australia?

Yes, but what I hope more is to see Australians visit my country to see what is really happening [and] to visit us as friends.

Is there any alternative to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara?

I think the most important thing now is to get free. We don’t need more time. We [Sahrawi] have a president, we have a parliament, a flag. We have everything: we just need our country. I think [after independence] we will have problems. But these problems will not be bigger than the occupation.

It has been 37 years since the International Court of Justice advised self-determination for Western Sahara. This conflict has been going since long before you were born. Realistically, what are the chances it will be resolved any time soon? Is there any hope?

Look, the problem is that we are so few. And [that] we do not just have one enemy, we have many — Morocco, France, Spain and the United States. So, things are going slowly. But we are going one step at a time.

One day we will [be] free, but we need a lot of help. I am here to talk to the Australian people — whereever we go, we talk to the people. People can do what governments cannot.

[Amidane will speak in Sydney on May 17.]

Calls for end to Western Sahara imports | Video & TV News Clips | SBS World News | Western Sahara Update

Calls for end to Western Sahara imports

Western Sahara is one of the world's most hotly disputed regions. Rich in phosphate, it was once a Spanish colony, but is now claimed by Morocco and independence group the Polisario Front. Rich in phosphate, it was once a Spanish colony, but is now claimed by Morocco and independence group the Polisario Front. Morocco governs much of the area, referring to it as the Southern Provinces. But a strip of Western Sahara is ruled by the Polisario Front, they call it the Liberated Territories. It's separated from the rest of Western Sahara by a wall, flanked by landmines. Now, a visiting human rights activist is calling for an end of phosphate imports from the territory. And Malak Amidan fears she will be jailed by Moroccan authorities for speaking out.

Saharawi Singer Aziza Brahim Releases La Tierra Derrama Lágrimas Music Video | Western Sahara Update

Saharawi Singer Aziza Brahim has a new music video titled La Tierra Derrama Lágrimas (the earth pours tears) filmed by Donal Scannell of Scanarama, from the upcoming album ‘Mabruk’ to be released on June 11.

Aziza Brahim embodies the new voice of the Saharawis (also known as Sahrawi), a people who resist and fight again to win their independence. Her songs evoke exile, the right to freedom and the martyrs of the Saharawi Polisario Front.

A Saharawi from Western Sahara, Aziza Brahim Maichan was born June 9th, 1976 in a refugee camp near Tinduf in Algeria. She spent seven years pursuing her studies in Cuba, which she abandoned to devote herself to music.

She returned to the Sahawari refugee camps in 1995. The same year she won the First National Song Prize at the festival of culture of the S.A.D.R. (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic) and made her first recordings for the National Saharawi Radio. She then joined the National Saharawi Group, making her first international tour, which took her to Mauritania and Algeria.

In 1998, in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture of the S.A.D.R., the label Nubenegra released the trilogy ‘Sahrauis’. In the album ‘A Pesar Des Las Heridas’, two of her songs appeared, ‘Dios Mio’ and ‘La Tierra Derrama Lagrimas’, which were well received on the international market and appeared in numerous compilations. With the group Leyuad, she made her first European tour the same year, performing on French, German and Spanish stages.

After her return to the camps, she made several recordings in 1999 for Tinduf radio with Tuareg musicians from Tamanrasset.

Since 2000, she has lived in Spain, and toured with Leyuad in Spain (2001), in France (2002 and 2003) and sharing the stage at the international festival in Mores (Germany) in 2003 with Ojos de Brujo and Cheb Khaled.

In 2005, she joined the group Yayabo Latin Jazz, which was her first experience integrating Sahrawi music with Caribbean rhythms. Her repertoire expanded with other people’s songs, notably those of Violeta Parra. The subjects she addressed found a counterpoint in Cuban tumbao, Castilian choruses and the open harmonies of Latin jazz.

Since 2006, she has led a new musical project with the group Gulili Mankoo, the result of her experiences with musicians from Africa and other continents and the influence of the Latin world. The group, made up of Saharawi, Spanish, Colombian and Senegalese musicians, is a fusion of African and Saharawi music, with accents of rock and blues. They tour throughout Spain, and in other European countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.

| Western Sahara Update

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'via Blog this'Call for Australia to stop Sahara phosphate imports
9 MAY 2012, 8:17 AM   -   SOURCE: GARETH BOREHAM, SBS

A Saharawi human rights activist is calling for Australia to stop phosphate imports from the strife-torn region of Western Sahara.
RELATED

• Calls for end to Western Sahara imports

By Gareth Boreham, SBS
Western Sahara is one of the world's most hotly disputed regions. Rich in phosphate, it was once a Spanish colony, but is now claimed by Morocco and independence group the Polisario Front.
Morocco governs much of the area, referring to it as the Southern Provinces. But a strip of Western Sahara is ruled by the Polisario Front, they call it the 'Liberated Territories'.
It's separated from the rest of Western Sahara by a wall, flanked by landmines.
Human rights activist, Malak Amidan, who's visiting Australia, is calling for Australia to stop phosphate imports from the territory.
She fears she will be jailed by Moroccan authorities for speaking out.
Malak Amidan says workers in Western Sahara are exploited every day. None more so than those in the territory's phosphate industry.
"These people are poor. They haven't anything… and that's what we come for, to ask the Australian people to help us," she says.
She's urging our political leaders to stop Australian companies importing the product from the region.
I come here to look for help from the Australian people because my people live in a horrible situation because of the companies who come to Western Sahara and steal our natural resources," Amidan told SBS.
Her visit has been sponsored by Australian unions accusing Morocco of human rights abuses in the region.
But the Fertilizer Industry Federation says the three companies that do source high-grade phosphate rock from Western Saharan deposits - Wesfarmers, Impact Fertilisers and Incitec Pivot - have advice it is legal under international law with no trading restrictions imposed by the Federal Government.
As she seeks to educate Australians about the situation in her homeland, Malak Amidan claims she will be sent to prison on her return for speaking out and wearing the Western Saharan flag.
The Moroccan embassy in Canberra has hit back, accusing Malak Amidan of peddling "cheap propaganda".
Western Sahara was a colony of Spain until the European power pulled out in 1975.
Since then, it's been the subject of dispute between the power that seized control, Morocco, and the Algerian-backed force pushing for independence, the Polisario.
Tensions escalated in late 2010 with the sides blaming each other for the deaths of civilians and security forces during a riot at a refugee camp set up by displaced Saharwis in protest at their living conditions under Moroccan rule.
The Moroccan Government broke up the camp, accusing the Algerian secret service of financing the operation to de-stabilise the region.
In a bid to shake-off allegations of abuse, the embassy points to the on-going presence of a United Nations monitor in the region.

While Morocco has suggested some self-autonomy for Western Sahara, it's steadfast in maintaining its right to the territory's vast sands.
Leaving the world hoping the UN can still negotiate a political solution to the impasse.
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The Western Sahara Peace Process: Tragedy or Farce? | Western Sahara Update

By Jacob Mundy on May 10, 2012 


out in the UN Security Council. This is when the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, its French acronym) comes up for its annual renewal. Western Sahara — Africa’s last colony according to the United Nations — is largely ignored by the Security Council the other eleven months of the year. The Secretary-General has a Person Envoy working on the case, former US Ambassador Christopher Ross, one of the great Arabophone diplomats of his age.  The mandate given to Ambassador Ross, to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution that will afford Western Sahara its long denied right to self-determination, is a farce and everyone knows it.

Morocco, the country that has illegally occupied Western Sahara since 1976, has made it abundantly clear that self-determination (that is, a referendum on independence) is out of the question. Backing Morocco’s unilateral assertion of sovereignty over Western Sahara is a member of the Permanent Five, France. What the United States is to Israeli interests on the Council, France is to Morocco’s. Even when Morocco does not hold a seat on the Council (as it will for the next two years), Paris and Rabat are thick as thieves when it comes to protecting Morocco’s control over Western Sahara.

By now it is well known that there is no will from the other permanent members of the Council to challenge France and Morocco on this issue. So every April Western Sahara’s “group of friends” (France, Russia, United States, United Kingdom, and Spain, the de jure administering power) comfortably assume their well established roles in the well scripted dramaturgy called the Western Sahara peace process.

For the native people of Western Sahara, who call themselves Sahrawis, the peace process has become a tragedy. Dispossessed of their homeland by Spain in 1885 and then Morocco nearly a hundred years later, the Western Saharan nationalist movement has found strong support in neighboring Algeria (Morocco’s regional adversary) and the African Union. That support, however, has its limits. Unlike East Timor, Western Sahara’s Asian twin in the annals of botched UN decolonizations, the Sahrawis remains under foreign domination or in exile. This year half the native population “celebrated” their thirty-seventh year in refugee camps in the roughest corner of the southwestern Algerian Sahara.

Sahrawi nationalists have become used to the cheap promises of the international community. Spain first promised a referendum on independence in 1974, prompting Morocco to invade the territory in 1975 right as Franco lay on his deathbed. As Moroccan and Western Saharan nationalist forces led by the Polisario Front waged war for Africa’s most sparsely inhabited desert territory, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union, attempted to convince Morocco that a referendum was the only way out. After years of stalling by Rabat, the OAU decided to recognize Western Sahara as sovereign nation under the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The issue then moved to the UN Security Council where it lingers to this day.

First established in 1991, MINURSO was implemented to achieve one simple task: to organize a vote on independence (or integration with Morocco) for some 300,000 native Western Saharans. At the time, the King of Morocco, Hassan II, was nominally committed to a referendum on independence, so long as his “Sahrawis” were also allowed to vote. After eight years of painstaking technical negotiations and the tedious individual vetting of over 180,000 potential voters, MINURSO finally seemed ready to hold a referendum in the summer of 1999 — right when Hassan II died and the UN referendum in East Timor turned into a bloody fiasco. Morocco’s willingness to contemplate a referendum on independence died with Hassan II, as did the Security Council’s willingness to press the Moroccan regime towards a contentious and ambiguous end game without clear final status arrangements. This is when the language of a mutually acceptable political solution began to creep into the peace process.

At that time, James Baker, the former US Secretary of State, was in the driver’s seat of the negotiations. With the referendum on hold, Baker first attempted to work with Morocco to see what level of autonomy Rabat might be willing to grant Western Sahara. In principle, Morocco’s new leader, King Mohammed VI, was committed to devolving central authority to a quasi-independent Western Sahara, so long as ultimate sovereignty rested with him. In practice, the Moroccan negotiation team proved unwilling to consider even the most banal power-sharing arrangements.

Baker put forward a framework for discussion but his diplomatic blurring of the meaning of self-determination prompted a strong rejection from Polisario and Algeria. The Western Saharan independence movement has always insisted that any final status arrangement─ be it integration, autonomy, or independence─ had to be approved by the people of Western Sahara in a referendum. Algeria, thanks to its position in the global hydrocarbon market, wields enough influence to make sure that Polisario is listened to.  The Security Council surprisingly agreed with Polisario, urging Baker to find a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for self-determination.

It is this language, which persists in UN Security Council resolutions on Western Sahara to date, that essentially gives both parties the ability to fire the person holding the position of the Secretary-General’s envoy. If Morocco feels that self-determination is being forced upon them, as they did when Baker put forward his final proposal in 2003, then they can stonewall in the name of a mutually agreed solution. If Polisario feels that self-determination is being undermined, then they can unilaterally declare no confidence in the Envoy and hope for a better hand next time. This is exactly what happened to Baker’s successor, Dutch diplomat Peter Van Walsum.

Not only is the Personal Envoy to Western Sahara expected to work miracles with an empty toolbox, the Secretariat has historically tolerated the parties’ unilateral rejection of the Envoy and members of the Security Council have failed to arm the Envoy with the means to get anything done.

This is the knife’s edge Ambassador Ross has walked since becoming the Personal Envoy in 2008. While Ross has managed to hold countless rounds of negotiations, there is apparently little to show for it. Polisario begrudgingly attends because they trust Ross, while Morocco’s “negotiating team” literally reads from a script prepared by the Palace from which they do not dare deviate from (thanks to the Interior Ministry minders watching over the Moroccan negotiators). For the past three years, both sides have mostly restated the positions they marked out in 2007: Morocco is willing to grant Western Sahara special regional status (an autonomy proposal that lacks all the legal hallmarks of genuine autonomy), while Polisario is willing to discuss post-referendum guarantees for a referendum that Morocco, and so too the Security Council, is unwilling to allow.

Today most of the debate surrounding the now routine renewal of the long moribund Western Sahara mission is not focused on MINURSO’s actual mandate (to hold a referendum). For several years, the major debate has been whether or not MINURSO should be allowed to monitor and report on human rights violations in the Moroccan occupied territory and the Polisario refugee camps in southwest Algeria. All other UN missions have this mandate, but morality and reason has its limits vis-à-vis French neocolonial interests. While the United States and United Kingdom (both ostensibly neutral in the dispute) favor the addition of human rights monitoring protocols to MINURSO’s mandate, their leverage over France is limited to one drastic threat: veto the renewal of MINURSO. As the presence of MINURSO — as is — is the key to maintaining a status quo Rabat and the Élysée see as beneficial, if sub-optimal; there appears to be some leverage to be gained from the veto (apart from any horse trading the Council members might do on other pet issues).

Last year the United States indeed is reported to have threatened to veto MINURSO to force Paris to acquiescence to human rights language in the April 2011 resolution. Washington got its way but with little to show for it. The 2012 draft report of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara (i.e., the initial draft written by MINURSO personnel in the territory) had little to say about human rights violations because Moroccan authoritiessystematically blocked the Mission from interacting with Sahrawis (as they have since blue helmets arrived in 1992).  In New York, Ban Ki-moon’s office and the peacekeeping department massaged these inconvenient truths out of the final public report that was released in April 2012 (as the Secretariat has done since 1992).

The warrant for including human rights language in the 2011 resolution came out of the first but largely forgotten uprising of the Arab Spring. In October and November 2010, thousands of Sahrawis attempted to re-occupy Western Sahara by setting up a protest camp outside of the territory’s largest city. A brutal Moroccan crackdown followed, resulting in several Sahrawian and Moroccan deaths. If mass violence is required for the Security Council to take a baby step towards expressing concern about human rights in Western Sahara, imagine what it will take for the Security Council to take MINURSO’s original mandate seriously.

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Jacob Mundy is an Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Colgate University. He is coauthor with Stephen Zunes of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse University Press), which went into its second printing in 2011. His current research in Libya, Sudan, and Algeria focuses on the relationship between the international response to mass atrocities and the global locations/allocations of energy resources.